University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

1-1-2012

Democratic Transitions in Divided States: The Case of Iraq
Kara Leigh Kingma
University of Denver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and the
Political History Commons

Recommended Citation
Kingma, Kara Leigh, "Democratic Transitions in Divided States: The Case of Iraq" (2012). Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. 848.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/848

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN DIVIDED STATES: THE CASE OF IRAQ
__________

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

__________

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

__________

by
Kara L. Kingma
June 2012
Advisor: Nader Hashemi

©Copyright by Kara L. Kingma 2012
All Rights Reserved

Author: Kara L. Kingma
Title: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN DIVIDED STATES: THE CASE OF IRAQ
Advisor: Nader Hashemi
Degree Date: June 2012
Abstract
Many theorists have posited that democratic transitions in states divided along
ethnic, racial, or religious lines are accompanied by violent conflict and thus unlikely to
succeed. The end of authoritarian rule in Iraq and the introduction of democracy by the
United States has been followed by many such challenges, and it has been argued that the
artificial Iraqi state and its Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia communities does not possess the
unity as required by democratic government. However, an informed analysis of Iraqi
democracy requires attention to the role of its authoritarian leaders and war and economic
hardships in making Iraq’s ethnosectarian communities largely competitive and
conflictual. Furthermore, it is possible that continued participation in democratic
institutions and processes, though imperfect, may build support for the system and
legitimize it as the means to make political decisions. As a consequence, Iraqis may
increasingly identify with the state and its democratic system rather than their more rigid,
and at times conflicting, ethnosectarian identities.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS
The issue of identity and its effect on statehood and governance is important,
especially in those countries whose populations are divided along ethnic, religious, or
tribal lines. This matter is particularly relevant in the Middle East, given that many of its
states were formed relatively arbitrarily by European leaders after World War I, with
little regard to how communities were divided or combined within new territorial
boundaries. The fledgling democracy in Iraq is currently facing challenges related to this
issue as its leaders attempt to fashion a more equitable and functioning government out of
distinct and sometimes conflicting groups. It is the hope of these leaders and of American
policymakers that democracy will offer representation to all Iraqis while also promoting
loyalty to the state rather than to more divisive subidentities.
I will argue that although American policymakers overestimated Iraqi national
unity in their initial attempts to introduce democracy, the democratization process may
itself offer the means by which a unified state is formed. In doing so, I look at the nature
of coalition building and cooperation among Iraqi political groupings and the pressing
economic and security issues that have forced such compromise. Furthermore, I will
contend that the successful “doing” of democracy may lead the Iraqi people to place trust
in the democratic system and see it as offering the political means to conflict resolution
and economic and social progress. Though Iraqis may be critical of the government in
terms of efficiency and responsiveness, it is possible to argue that most have come to
1

understand that their political and economic futures, both as individuals and
communities, are tied to participation in the democratic process.
In “Beyond Identity,” Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper assert:
…identity denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members of
a group or a category. This may be understood objectively (as a sameness ‘in
itself’) or subjectively (as an experienced, felt, or perceived sameness).1
Their statement captures the fluid nature of identity, as it can change over time depending
upon individuals’ perceptions under various circumstances that call forth their
identification with one group or another. Brubaker and Cooper see identity as the basis on
which collective action can take place, and a product of that very action.2 Individuals who
view themselves as part of an ethnic community or as citizens of the larger state will thus
act with other members of the particular group while simultaneously strengthening the
concept of the very group within which they are acting.
A number of influential political theorists have set forth ideas as to how identity,
whether based on the state or otherwise, affects state building and the formation of
democratic government. As Robert A. Dahl notes:
…the democratic process presupposes a unity. The criteria of the democratic
process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit itself is not
considered proper or rightful – if its scope or domain is not justifiable – then it
cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedures.3
In his famous work, “Transitions to Democracy,” Dankwart A. Rustow asserts that rather
than economic or cultural explanations, what matters most for the process of
democratization is the single background condition of national unity. In explaining this
unity, he writes, “It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be
1
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must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong
to.”4 It seems both authors contend that a successful democratic government requires, at
the least, a defined territorial state that is agreed upon by all of its members as fitting and
legitimate. This is a salient issue for Iraq, and not only for the Kurds, as many Sunnis and
Shia also seem to question whether they owe their allegiance to the larger Iraqi nation or
to their smaller respective communities.
Iraq is a particularly interesting case given its history as a tenuous political entity
created out of distinct and at times conflicting former provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
After its independence from Great Britain in 1932, successive leaders worked to foster a
common nationalism among Iraq’s citizens. As early as 1933, however, King Faisal
lamented:
…there is still…no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings,
devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities,
connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually
ready to rise against any government whatsoever.5
This situation seemed to have changed little after six decades of national independence,
for in 1982 a member of the Baathist inner cadre echoed King Faisal’s sentiments,
writing as reported by Adeed Dawisha that “secessionism, sectarianism and
tribalism…are tearing the unity of [Iraqi] society to pieces.”6
Perhaps most notable in Iraq’s modern, pre-democratic history was Saddam
Hussein’s manipulation of identity for personal and political gain. Saddam’s Baathist
Party initially offered hope to Iraqis as it promised “a progressive, nationalist, and anti-
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imperialist future,”7 as well as equality between the various religious communities.
However, Saddam used Baathism to create a nationalism that was, above all, loyal to
himself. He then went on to emphasize different aspects of Iraqi identity at different
points in time depending on which was most politically expedient. For example, he
stressed Arab identity during the Iran-Iraq war, Islamic identity during the first Gulf War
in response to Western intervention, and tribal identity during the economic and social
upheavals following the implementation of sanctions by the United States.8
One might argue that the national unity and state identification as suggested by
Dahl and Rustow to be necessary for democratic government did not exist at the time of
the U.S. invasion. W. Andrew Terrill echoed this claim when he wrote in 2009 of the
political situation following Saddam’s fall:
The preferred option of most Iraqis is not yet fully clear. Moreover, the type of
regime change that they support will have a great deal to do with how they define
their own identities in a postwar environment. In the aftermath of Saddam’s
ouster, Iraqis must determine how to order and emphasize their national and
subnational identities…They must further decide if their ethnic and religious
identities are complementary or antithetical to their identities as Iraqis.9
Eric Davis, author of Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in
Modern Iraq, similarly contends that at the time of the American-led effort to remove
Saddam, the nature of the Iraqi political system remained an unresolved question and thus
was likely to cause conflict.10 In this view, it is no surprise that the removal of Saddam

7
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and the attempts by the U.S. to create a functioning democratic government have been
marked by violence and discord.
It is also not clear the American policymakers responsible for formulating the
next steps after the invasion fully understood Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions. After
years of Saddam’s policy of exacerbating tensions among communities to obtain support
from alternating segments of Iraqi society and to better control the country’s diverse
groups, it might have been expected that Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds would be distrustful
of each other and their roles in the new power structures. Additionally, the failure of the
United States to provide sufficient security immediately following the invasion
contributed to Iraqi skepticism toward the central government and its American partners.
Many Iraqis looked to their ethnic and religious communities for protection and
continued to associate most strongly with these groups during the state’s early democratic
practices.
Iraqi identity has been characterized by competing and often conflicting ethnic
and religious divisions. This is both a result of elite manipulation, especially under
Saddam as he viewed such management necessary for retaining authoritarian control, and
a symptom of the miscalculations of American policymakers in their attempts to
implement democracy in a country whose context of nationality they seemed to little
understand. As Davis argues:
…the inability of Iraqis to construct a viable model of political community
explains to a large degree the country’s political and social instability. The
absence of a commonly accepted model of political community is related to the
problem of collective identity and foundational myths.11

11

Davis, 2.
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It is possible, however, that Iraq’s democratic government, by providing equal
representation and procedural fairness to individuals from all groups, might form an Iraqi
nation even though the Iraqi state has long existed. Through institutions and policies that
promote inclusion and offer opportunities for cooperation across ethnosectarian lines,
democracy can provide Iraqis the means for consolidating the government and the state.
Given the implications of a stable and democratic state for the region as a whole
and for American interests there, I seek to better understand a number of topics,
including: the seeming link between democratization and conflict in states divided along
identity lines; the evolution of Iraqi national identity and the role of its leaders in the
process; decisions made by the U.S. in its invasion and occupation that complicated the
democratic transition; and most importantly, the prospects for democratic consolidation
and with it, the formation of a civic, Iraqi identity. This final issue is significant as Iraq’s
domestic situation has the potential to affect the stability of the larger Middle East,
particularly in the absence of American troops following their withdrawal in December
2011.
In the second chapter, I explore research done on the relationship between the
transition to democracy and conflict in states with various ethnic, religious, or other
identity groups. I begin by noting various approaches to the concept of identity in order to
grasp what it means and how it relates to citizens in representative democracies. Most
significantly, I summarize a range of explanations as to why democratization is often
accompanied by violence and how this affects the behavior of political actors, the
electoral process, and democratic practices more generally. I pay special attention to the
role of political elites, and argue the likelihood of conflict can be partly mitigated through
6

their attention to the participation and inclusion of all parties. Iraq’s experience with
sectarian conflict and domestic instability is perhaps unsurprising when viewed in the
context of the broader challenges faced by divided states during democratization.
In chapter three, I give a brief modern history of Iraq with a focus on the fluid
nature of Iraqi identity. Iraqis’ ambiguity toward the state as an object of their loyalty is
partly a symptom of the state’s relatively short existence and disagreement over its
rightful nature; however, I argue it is better explained by the policies of political elites
and legacies of war and crises. Iraq’s communities have displayed cooperation at various
points in the state’s history, but national leaders generally failed to implement the policies
and processes necessary for involving citizens from all ethnic and sectarian groups. Iraq’s
experience with war and economic hardship since the 1980s worsened most citizens’
identification with the state, as competition for political and economic goods took place
largely on the basis of tribal and religious affiliations.
Chapter four focuses on the mistakes committed by the United States pre- and
post- 2003 invasion and how those errors made it more difficult for Iraqis’ to reconcile
their religious and ethnic identities with the civic identity required for a newly democratic
polity. Such errors include the de-Baathification project and its marginalization of the
Sunni population, the disbanding of the Iraqi army, and miscalculations in the
implementation of democratic institutions and processes. The resulting inter- and
intrasectarian violence complicated an already challenging situation and further
weakened the state in its ability to satisfy new demands for political participation.
Though multiple elections have been held and a constitution was created, the political and
security consequences of these mistakes continue to test Iraqi democracy.
7

I tackle the outstanding issue of the Kurds in chapter five, as their unique and
contentious history poses another problem to the consolidation of democracy in Iraq.
Though at times it seemed their place in the central government was improving, in
general Kurdish relations with Baghdad were hostile. The invasion of Iraq by the U.S.
was met with cooperation by the Kurds, and their willingness to participate in the new
democratic system enabled them to play an important role in the early formation of the
constitution and government. As demands by the Shia and Sunni have strengthened,
however, the Kurds must negotiate between a desire to remain autonomous and the
possibility of further involvement and identification with the central state. Successful
integration of the Kurds will both strengthen the democratic system and reduce the
likelihood of future conflict.
In chapter six, I summarize recent events in Iraq with a concentration on evidence
of intersectarian cooperation and support of democracy. I put these events in the context
of important work done by various theorists on democratization whose arguments
strengthen the view that Iraqi democracy can in fact gain legitimacy and stability. This
analysis allows me to contend that democratization can succeed even in an arguably
fragmented state such as Iraq. Though Iraq may not meet what many theorists’ argue to
be the prerequisites for democratic government, I assert that trust in the democratic
government and its mechanisms for reducing conflict, guaranteeing rights, and allocating
goods and services may lead to a stable and functioning representative government. I
believe it can be shown that the actual “doing” of democracy, of forming governments
and of making policy decisions, may help to engender an Iraqi identity distinct from and
encompassing other ethnic and religious subdivisions.
8

Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings and suggestions for the future
of Iraqi democracy. While I readily acknowledge the threats to democracy posed by
pressing social and economic concerns and the actions of self-serving elites, I hope to
show that a lasting democratic Iraq is feasible. Iraq’s democratic system, though
imperfect, will strengthen and be sustained through continued participation in its
elections and adherence to the guarantees and constraints provided by its institutions.
This argument is consistent with Brubaker and Cooper’s belief in the action oriented
nature of identity; that by acting as though part of the Iraqi state and responsible for its
continuation and success, Iraqis will come to see themselves as citizens first and
foremost.

9

CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICT DURING DEMOCRATIZATION – A GENERAL
SUMMARY
There has been extensive research done on the link between democratic
transitions and identity-based conflict. It is largely accepted that states divided along
religious, ethnic, racial, or other lines are likely to experience violence during the
democratization process. However, this observation presents a paradox: though the
democratic transition will probably lead to conflict, effective democratic government
offers the best means of ameliorating such conflict by creating civic, less rigid identities
and channeling differences through institutions that provide equal representation and
procedural fairness. While established democratic systems are arguably better at dealing
with disputes among communities and individuals, the lack of functioning institutions
and an inconsistent adherence to the rule of law characteristic of transitional democracies
often triggers identity conflict and threatens democratic consolidation.
Analysts of democratization have frequently posited that diverse societies face
special challenges in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. As M. Steven
Fish and Robin S. Brooks write, “…ethnic differences divide society and make
compromise and consensus difficult. Heterogeneity poses the risk of intercommunal
violence, which can undermine open politics.”12 In this view, the values of cooperation

12

M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, “Does Diversity Hurt Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 15.1
(2004): 154.
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and negotiation so important in democracy are challenged by citizens who perceive
loyalty to the clan or ethnic group as prior to loyalty to the shared territorial state.
Democracy involves the freedom of individuals to associate with and lobby on behalf of
those with whom they share interests. If these associations correspond almost exclusively
to one’s ethnicity, race, or religion, political outcomes that favor other groups will be
seen as threats to the very existence of such identities.
Some of the worst incidents of conflict between ethnic and religious groups
during the transition to democracy have occurred in Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon,
and Sri Lanka. Conflict seemingly associated with the new democratic government has
also occurred among Iraq’s communities, leading many observers to question whether
democracy is viable in a state with such ethnic and sectarian divisions. As intersectarian
violence remains a challenge to Iraq’s democracy, it is instructive to review major
theorists’ arguments regarding the democracy-conflict nexus, including the role of
identity, elites, and institutions. A complete analysis of Iraq reveals that though its early
record confirms many of these theorists’ predictions, continued experience with the
democratic system may provide long-term stability.
Because of the likelihood that conflict will occur during democratization, many
theorists have argued that well-functioning democratic states require unified nations.
Such states will not face significant threats to their authority and legitimacy by groups
that enjoy competing loyalty. As Clarisa Rile Hayward writes:
Democracy needs some form of citizen-identity for purposes of integration…If
‘rule by the people’ is to mean more than simply rule by the majority in the
interest of the majority…then every democratic polity needs some civic bond,
11

some cohesive force that can prompt its citizens to act politically in ways that take
into account the claims and the perspectives of others.13
Successful democracy in divided states arguably entails citizens that cooperate and
recognize common interests across divisions for the good of the shared polity. Such
empathy also reduces perceptions of grievance among minorities or other communities
whose members are limited in the representative power.
In other words, democracies need inclusive identities that all or nearly all citizens
agree upon. These identities form the foundation of citizens’ equal belonging in the state.
The idea of identity, however, is vague from both a conceptual and functional standpoint.
The Encyclopedia of Political Science notes that “[g]enerally, the sense of self is
validated by membership in a group or affiliation with something intangible such as a
culture or religion,”14 prompting individuals to identify with such groups. Given
individuals’ proclivity to join others on the basis of intangible qualities, “[o]ne of the
most prominent issues of the postmaterialist world is identity.”15 In the modern nationstate system, individuals sometimes identify with substate groups that challenge either the
state’s political authority or territorial legitimacy. Consequently:
Parties that bitterly oppose one another within a given state might each be
recognized as embodying a ‘politics of identity’ focused on defending the
interests and values of their particular nationality rather than on the state as a
whole.16

13
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2010), 756.
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There is also debate concerning the nature of identity and how it is acquired and
maintained. Primordialists view identity as unchanging, essential, and deeply rooted
regardless of context. Accordingly, conflict between or among identity groups is
inevitable and intractable. Constructivists, on the other hand, focus on political and
socioeconomic factors that stimulate conflict on the basis of identities that in other
circumstances may exist alongside each other peacefully. This perspective “is more
dynamic than the former [primordialism] because it stresses change, contextuality, and
competition among ethnic [or other identity] groups for resources.”17 Only when identity
becomes implicated in the struggle for political and economic goods is conflict likely and
problematic for diverse states and societies.
Identity in the Middle East is of particular interest because the division of colonial
empires was largely unsuccessful in ingraining a sense of loyalty to the modern states and
their nascent structures. In many cases, the new state boundaries did not correspond to
existing ethnic and tribal divisions. Furthermore, state institutions tended to favor groups
on the basis of their identities rather than considerations of ability and merit. P.R.
Kumaraswamy writes:
More than three-quarters of a century after the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire, from whom most of them emerged, these states have been unable to
define, project, and maintain a national identity that is both inclusive and
representative.18

17

Demet Yalcin Mousseau, “Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?”, Journal of
Peace Research 38.5 (2001): 549.
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International Affairs 10.1 (2006): 63.
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Though the existence of Middle Eastern states is today largely unchallenged, nationalism
centered on the country and its governmental institutions is combined with or in some
instances threatened by loyalty to religion, ethnicity, tribe, or clan.
These states’ failure to resolve this tension is in many ways related to their
inability or perhaps unwillingness to include all citizens in the state’s political and
economic development equally, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Kumaraswamy
continues:
Without exception, all of the Middle Eastern states have tried to impose an
identity from above. Whether ideological, religious, dynastical, or powercentric,
these attempts have invariably failed and have often resulted in schism and
sectarian tensions.19
Debate in the Middle East over the nature of the state and its foundations is particularly
salient as demands for just and representative government have increased. In some cases,
identities were manipulated or played off each other by authoritarian regimes to maintain
power, worsening tensions. Even in those states that have succeeded in overthrowing
autocratic leaders, there remains disagreement among citizens over the proper
understanding of the state and the identity of its people.
Dankwart A. Rustow also draws attention to considerations of identity in the
transition to representative government. He posits that rather than certain economic or
cultural provisions, democratization requires “a single background condition – national
unity.”20 A political system such as democracy, in which power naturally shifts and
uncertainties are common, needs individuals that are not frightened by the prospect of

19

Kumaraswamy, “Who Am I?”, 63.
Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2.3
(1970): 350.

20

14

their community or identity group temporarily losing power. Additionally, according to
Alfred C. Stepan, “…citizens within a democratic federation should have dual but
complementary political identities.”21 While individuals may rightfully remain part of
their ethnic or religious communities, they must also agree to participate in the shared
civic sphere on an equal basis with those from other groups.
Juan J. Linz and Stepan refer to this issue as a “stateness” problem, one in which
“a significant proportion of the population does not accept the boundaries of the
territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimate political unit to
which they owe obedience.”22 Earlier analyses of democratic transitions had paid little
attention to the potential incongruence between territorial boundaries and national
identities. In most of those cases, particularly in Southern Europe and Latin America,
ethnic and religious nationalist threats to the state were not a factor. The spread of
democracy to Eastern Europe, for example, where states contained multiple nationalisms
competing for political and economic power, brought this issue to the attention of
theorists and policymakers. The spread of democracy was still viewed positively, but
analysts wondered if the new considerations posed by these states would inhibit the
seeming worldwide trend to representative government.
Citizens who are not convinced of their belonging in the polity will likely adhere
to the groups to which they feel more loyal during times of uncertainty, including the
democratic transition. As Mark R. Beissinger argues, some may react violently as they
compete for power due to “…the larger system of ethnic social relationships that
21
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democratization potentially reconfigures and the ways in which democratization engages
the interests and passions of large numbers of people.”23 Different groups are brought
into contact in the context of competition for political power, including the ability to
make decisions on state goods and resources. Because communities see their futures as
closely tied to such issues, determining who makes these decisions becomes a major
source of contention.
In Seymour Martin Lipset’s famous work, “Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” he posits a number of
conditions necessary for democratic government. One of them is legitimacy, or wide
support for the political system by the citizens of the state. Challenges to such legitimacy
arise during the transition to democracy:
…if (a) all major groups do not secure access to the political system early in the
transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop political demands; or, if (b)
the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during the period of
structural change.24
Both of these outcomes are likely during democratization in divided states. Democracy
inevitably leads to new power configurations and involves individuals of different races,
ethnicities, and religions in the struggle for political power. Perceptions of grievance
among one or more such groups will lead them to disapprove of the system and seek its
end. Furthermore, the potential loss of power for an identity group that was generally
favored under authoritarian rule may become another source of tension.

23
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The probability of conflict during democratization has been confirmed by
numerous studies. Stephen M. Saideman and others engage in such an analysis, writing:
…we assume that groups are more likely to act up when they are uncertain about
their position and prospects for the future. Thus we expect more ethnic conflict
during periods of institutional upheaval in which new regimes are installed and
elections are held for the first time.25
Their study goes on to empirically verify this prediction. The level and nature of conflict
naturally differs among democratizing countries, however. This variance depends on,
among other factors, the way in which elites employ identity for their own purposes, the
extent to which identity becomes a marker for access to the political system, and “the
opportunities for and obstacles to the mobilization of ethnic differences.”26 While conflict
is likely, its degree and character differs according to a state’s past experiences with
identity relations and the decisions made by elites during this contentious period.
Democracy faces further challenges in countries where war centered largely on
ethnic or religious differences has already occurred. Anna K. Jarstad summarizes:
Insecurity and unsolved grievances mean that political elites, as well as civil
society, remain polarized and that the basis for inclusive ideologies is weak. In
combination with a shattered infrastructure, and an economy structured on the
spoils of war, this polarization implies that democratization faces particular
challenges in post-war societies.27
Competition for political power often reignites the same aspirations and grievances that
were a subject of fighting during the war. Additionally, violence may reignite and

25
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challenge both the political system and any sort of emerging peace settlement if
democracy fails to fix the problems that led to or were aggravated by conflict.
Jack Snyder also compiles evidence of the democracy-conflict link in his book,
From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. Drawing from
instances of ethnic and identity conflict during the 1990s, he argues that most of the states
implicated:
…experienced a partial improvement in their political or civil liberties in the year
or so before the strife broke out. Most of these conflicts occurred in states that
were taking initial steps toward a democratic transition, such as holding contested
elections and allowing a variety of political groups to criticize the government and
each other.28
In Yugoslavia, for example, relatively peaceful relations among ethnic groups were made
more conflictual as a result of the democratization process. The democratic transition
brought “rising expectations, a higher level of resources, the assertiveness of newly active
forces, and the relaxation of traditional constraints,”29 all placing stress on intergroup
relations.
Like Saideman et al., Snyder notes that the leadership and early institutions
present during democratization play a crucial role and either help or hurt the formation of
a civic, national identity. He writes: “How people are included in the political life of their
state determines the kind of nationalist consciousness that they develop, as well as the
degree of nationalist conflict that democratization brings.”30 This evidence is more in line
with a constructivist view of identity, as conflict among ethnic and religious communities
28
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becomes more problematic because of the opportunities and motivations presented in
democratic government. If groups receive credible guarantees that their members will be
included and their interests acknowledged in the new power configuration, they may
become more supportive of the state generally and democratic processes in particular.
The likelihood of conflict is greatly affected by the presence of elites who take
advantage of the transitional uncertainty to mobilize support and gain followers through
appeals to identity. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that while political
entrepreneurs might not subscribe to the views of extremists who completely oppose
compromise across identity groups, they understand the usefulness of identity arguments
to succeed politically. Accordingly, “Ethnicity often provides a key marker for selfaggrandizing politicians seeking to build constituencies for attaining or maintaining
political power.”31 A process of “ethnic outbidding” then ensues where more moderate
politicians realize they must too seek support on the basis of ethnicity, race, or religion in
order to compete with more immoderate candidates. Consequently, citizens’ choices of
candidates are differentiated largely by their membership in a particular community, and
they come to equate their political identities with their ethnic or religious identities.
Benjamin Reilly similarly argues that the mobilization of identity by elites and the
formation of identity-based political parties are common during democratization in
multiethnic states. In his view, the emotive nature of appeals to a community’s history
and survival is especially contributory to the likelihood of conflict during this period.32
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Burundi is one state where ethnic mobilization by elites in the context of competition for
political power led to disastrous outcomes. While the 1993 elections were intended to
create a power-sharing government, the formation and strengthening of parties
characterized by ethnic identities and demands “served as a catalyst for the ethnic
genocide that was to follow.”33 Not every case of violence is so extreme, but Burundi is
evidence of the important role of elites in the process and their potential to either help or
hurt democratization.
The potential for identity conflict is also a product of the effectiveness of the state
in providing social and economic goods for all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, race, or
religion. The state itself can play an important role in creating a national identity that
might not exist naturally within its territorial boundaries. As Sami Zubaida argues:
…there is a ‘material’ basis to this formation of the nation-state in the economicfiscal function of the state, its allocation of resources and employment in its
swelling ranks, supplemented by a national educational system that produces
qualifications for employment, and cultural field of media operating in a
standardized national language.34
Many of these tasks are implicated in a state’s modernization in the fields of
communications, education, and industry. If states are unable to successfully develop
their economies and social structures, however, attempts to create a national identity will
be ineffective and may even generate tensions due to a perception that some groups have
benefited at the expense of others.
States such as these have largely failed to create the social capital, or social
relations based on cooperation and trust, often considered necessary for democracy.
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Snyder emphasizes the challenges to democratization in states with economic and social
hardships:
Traditional patronage networks often dominate the politics of such states. […]
The capacity of these societies for mass-scale collective action is so low that
patronage networks tend to focus on smaller-scale ties among personal cronies,
strongmen, clans within the broader ethnic groups, or other localized networks.35
Though democracy provides greater access to the political system, societies
inexperienced in cooperation across identity groups in pursuit of broad, national goals
may fail to take advantage of new opportunities for civic engagement and identification.
Rather, citizens of these states will continue to look to their respective communities for
security and support.
Identity conflict related to democratization in turn weakens the state and lessens
its ability to manage threats to its authority and security. Lake and Rothchild believe
much of this conflict is initiated by groups that are distrustful of the state’s capacity to
mediate among competing demands and thus worry about their communities’ future
economic and political wellbeing. Accordingly, “Collective fears of the future arise when
states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of
protection for groups.”36 Elites who appeal to ethnicity or religion become more
attractive and seek to capitalize on the fears of their supporters, leading to further
destabilization.
Lake and Rothchild go so far as to argue that state weakness is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of violence among ethnic or other identity groups. They
write:
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As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve
strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous
violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the
security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and
conflict becomes more likely.37
It is also possible that the process of democratization, by threatening established power
relationships, will lead once dominant actors and their followers to seek to keep the state
weak and easy manipulated. Successful democratic consolidation is then threatened as the
state is unable to provide security and the new institutions remain ineffectual. Again, a
constructivist view of identity is implicated as state weakness prior to or as a result of
democracy is problematic in the incentives and opportunities it provides for identity
conflict.
As will be explained more fully in following chapters, Iraq was in many respects
a weak state at the time of the 2003 invasion and American-led transition to democracy.
This weakness combined with divisions along identity lines ensured that democratization
would face numerous challenges. Andreas Wimmer writes in 2004:
…even if most Iraqis wanted democracy, it may not work because the political
conflicts unleashed by democratization exceed the conflict absorption capacities.
More specifically, democracy entails the danger that the demands of the Kurds,
Shia, and Sunni leaders spiral up and unleash centripetal forces that cannot be
held in check by a weak center.38
While the extent of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions is debatable, increased demands
for political and economic power in an already fragile state served to antagonize
communities and complicate the process. Democracy became framed as a competition
among the Kurds, Shia, and Sunni for control of the state.
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The Sunni reaction to democratization, for example, confirms the expectation that
the uncertainty of a democratic transition increases the likelihood of conflict in divided
states. This is especially the case when an ethnic or religious minority was favored by the
authoritarian regime, as the Sunnis were by Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. In
such a situation, Beissinger writes:
…changing the regime necessarily means fundamentally changing the system of
ethnic stratification. The main problem facing democratizers in such countries is
how to demobilize previously favored minorities and gain their acquiescence to
their altered, less favored role in a reconstructed social order.39
The process of de-Baathification undertaken by the U.S., through which thousands of
Sunnis belonging to Saddam’s Baath party were removed from their state positions, did
little to reassure Iraq’s Sunnis that democratization would not involve anything more than
their loss of power at the hands of the Shia and Kurds.
Lake and Rothchild similarly argue that it is often the perceptions of the minority
concerning their place in the new system that determines the viability of democracy.
Much of this is due to their fears of the future, as well as the inadequacy of the new
democratic institutions to adequately express and protect their interests. According to
Lake and Rothchild:
…for the less powerful group to agree voluntarily to enter and abide by the
contract, its interests must also be addressed, including its concern that the more
powerful group will try to exploit it and alter the terms of the contract at some
future date. Indeed, it is the minority, fearful of future exploitation and violence,
that ultimately determines the viability of any existing ethnic contract.40
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Though democracy in theory protects the individual rights of all citizens, its majoritarian
outcomes may lead minority groups to be concerned for both their political and security
prospects.
Elections are the major arena within which frustration and anxiety play out during
democratization, and thus commonly provoke conflict. Groups that expect to lose power
as a result of the election process attempt to discredit this crucial step in the democratic
transition. According to Jarstad:
By threats and intimidation, these actors may seek to disrupt the transition,
overthrow the election results, or prevent election campaigns or voters from going
to the polls. In the worst cases, elections trigger violent conflict and the process of
democratization is halted or reversed.41
Though it is hoped political parties or factions will form on the basis of issues other than
identity, the highly competitive nature of the first contest for political power often leads
elites and individuals to support those groups with whom they feel the most affinity. The
lines drawn in the process of the first election may then come to characterize the creation
of a government and future elections.
Voting along strictly identity lines was particularly obvious in Bosnia’s first
democratic electoral contest. Deep enmity and distrust among ethnic groups there
prevented the formation of multiethnic political parties and significant voting across
ethnicities. The resulting divided government meant that any cooperation or deliberation
among ethnic groups had to be done at the elite level, limiting citizen participation and
broader societal change.42 Interactions among Bosnian ethnic groups were truly strained,
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and democratization did not succeed in bringing groups together in an equal and
representative political system. While it was hoped later elections would shift from
essentially ethnic censuses, there has so far been little incentive for political actors to
seek support from individuals outside their communities. The government remains
divided, with political contests viewed in strictly ethnic terms.
In democratization more generally, elections are viewed as an important event in
the progression towards representative government. As a result:
Where favorable circumstances prevail (i.e., an agreement on the rules of the
political game, broad participation in the voting process, and a promising
economic environment), elections can promote stability.43
This is very rarely the case in new democracies or democracies affected by some level of
identity conflict. For example, ethnic conflict followed many states’ initial experiments
with popular elections in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.44 An avoidance of
such problems would seem to require that the actors most involved in the transition
consider the fears and demands of political participants while attempting to establish and
adhere to clear and equitable rules.
Linz and Stepan argue that the order of elections is important for avoiding or at
least managing these problems. According to their analysis, national elections should be
held first to encourage the framing of issues and positions on national terms. Political
parties will then have an incentive to appeal to individuals from all groups in order to
widen their support base. Winners of national contests will also need to make decisions
on the basis of what is best for the entire country, rather than one community or region.
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Conversely, if regional elections are held first, political actors have reasons to focus on
narrower interests. In the process, the state comes to be viewed as a collection of distinct
and competing regions rather than a unified whole.45 Linz and Stepan show that this was
the case in Yugoslavia, where ethnic issues became dominant after the regional elections
in 1990.
Given the contentious nature of elections in newly democratic countries, many
theorists have drawn attention to the role of electoral systems in encouraging various
political outcomes. Donald Horowitz, for example, argues, “The electoral system is by far
the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation and harmony in
severely divided societies.”46 Benjamin Reilly, in his summary of institutional choices for
new democracies, similarly notes that the “strategies of cooperation or antagonism”
provided for by different electoral systems influence both election results and other
political practices within democratic government.47 The importance of the first elections
in shaping future party relations and political campaigns requires a consideration of how
actors might react during the lead-up and holding of elections. This includes an
acknowledgment of the ways elites frame the campaign and their effects on the process.
Voters in states where this is not sufficiently accounted for often end up
perceiving elections as a zero-sum game. Accordingly, they believe their identity group
must win in order to participate in any meaningful way in the government. This winnertake-all mentality could be said to have influenced democratic elections in Nigeria, where
45
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violent ethno-religious conflicts spread after the first election of a post-military regime.
Ukoha Ukiwo writes, “…the majoritarian principle is problematic in plural societies
because ethnic parties that lose elections tend to reject not only the election results but
also the whole gamut of democratic institutions by appealing to violence.”48 Elections are
symbolic in their signaling of the end of authoritarianism, and functional in their seating
of a representative government. If they fail to bring all major groups into the democratic
system, however, there is the risk that groups that perceive themselves slighted will resort
to other, possibly violent means to voice their demands.
Beyond general agreement on the importance of electoral systems and their
influence on political behavior, however, theorists have numerous stances on the
specifics of institutional engineering. According to Reilly, this disagreement is largely on
the lines of party list proportional representation versus alternative vote, single
transferable vote, or other rules that incentivize the creation of ethnically or religiously
heterogeneous political parties.49 In many ways this characterizes the debate over
consociationalism versus centripetalism. There is continued discussion considering the
merits of each system, but:
Regardless of whether consociational or centripetal approaches (or some mixture
of the two) are favored, there is widespread agreement among many scholars that
some type of power-sharing government featuring all significant groups is an
essential part of democracy-building in divided societies.50
It is important that all groups are included and, as a result, invested in the government.
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Still, there cannot be said to be one electoral system or system of institutions that
works best for all democracies in divided states. Much depends on context. As Reilly and
Andrew Reynolds write:
The optimal choice for peacefully managing conflict depends on several
identifiable factors specific to the country, including the way and degree to which
ethnicity is politicized, the intensity of conflict, and the demographic and
geographic distribution of ethnic groups.51
Additionally, the system most likely to bring an end to conflict may unfortunately not
best provide for government effectiveness and eventual democratic consolidation. The
role of elites and their willingness to cooperate and govern for the best of all communities
is also crucial.
The challenges outlined above have led some observers to question whether
democratic government is both feasible and desirable in states whose populations are
divided along religious or ethnic lines. It should be acknowledged, however, that the
presence of multiple identity groups within a state does not guarantee conflict nor prevent
successful democratization. Rather, it matters more how the issues of uncertainty and
competition are handled during the transition. The absence of functioning institutions and
governmental ineffectiveness characteristic of early democracies means such regimes are
unable to accommodate the demands of all new political actors. Still, institutionalized and
rule-bound democracy remains the best option for managing identity conflict and
addressing the demands and grievances of both communities and individuals.
Iraq has faced many of the challenges associated with democratization described
here. Its sectarian and ethnic divisions were combined with a weak state and a collapse of
51
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security. New political opportunities encouraged competition for control of the state by
groups that had previously been marginalized, raising the stakes of electoral success and
potential loss of power. As has been argued, it is in such contexts that relevant actors
must recognize the potential for conflict and seek to ensure that the new democratic
institutions include all groups. Though Iraq’s experience is in many ways not unique, its
historical circumstances and progress to this point deserve attention and analysis in order
to determine its potential success.
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CHAPTER THREE: IDENTITY IN IRAQ – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
While conflict regarding the identities of Iraqis seems to have worsened since the
U.S. invasion, uncertainty over the proper object of their loyalty has existed since the
creation of the state. As Adeed Dawisha writes:
The concern over Iraqi unity relates to the seeming gradual eclipse of a national
Iraqi identity by sub-state, ethnosectarian identities. But that is hardly a unique or
even contemporary phenomenon. Multiple identities and loyalties are as old as
Iraqi history.52
Over time, divisions have manifested between Sunni and Shia, Arab and non-Arab, and
nationalism based on pan-Arabism and the territorial state. A better understanding of the
historical development of Iraqi identity is crucial for an analysis of its modern democratic
system and the prospects for its success.
There was little sense of shared identity at the time of Iraq’s creation. The
economy was based predominately on agriculture, with few towns. Tribal ties and kinship
were the major determinants of relationships and there were limited links among people
of different regions.53 Despite evidence that the geographic term “Iraq” was in use since
the medieval era and increasingly by travelers and officials during the 1800s, it is unclear
if the population viewed themselves in terms of territory. As Phebe Marr argues, Iraq was
subject to “invasion, disruption, and discontinuity” beginning with the Mogul conquest in
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the 13th century, and as a result, was “an environment in which a cohesive identity,
especially one based on territory, did not easily take root.”54 In this view, the state of Iraq
is largely artificial, composed of groups who have little in common in terms of history or
culture.
Iraq is not unique in the challenges it has faced related to nation and statebuilding, coupled with a history of invasion and foreign occupation. Gareth R.V.
Stansfield notes this, writing:
The logical progression of Western nation-building…starts out from ‘the state,’
goes through the constitution of a political nation inclusive of all citizens
irrespective of class and geographic location and finally yields cultural
homogeneity and cohesion,55
an assumption completely absent in Iraq. Rather, Iraq is divided along sectarian and
ethnic lines and composed of communities with historically little or no connection to the
center. A state such as Iraq with no coherent, unified, national identity is not fertile for
representative government in which political actors are expected to cooperate and
compromise for the good of the entire country rather than their respective ethnic or
sectarian identity groups.
Yet others argue that most Iraqis do consider themselves Iraqi first and Shia,
Sunni, Turkoman, or Kurd second. Iraqi national unity exists “even after 35 years of
wars, the brutal suppression of minority rights, and the continued assault on civil
society.”56 If this is so, it is worth asking why sectarian identities have often conflicted
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and violently reasserted themselves in the period following Saddam’s removal. The true
nature of these divisions and the causes of their manifestation must be accounted for in an
analysis of the democratic transition and the likelihood of democratic stability. If conflict
among Iraq’s communities is based on primordial identities vying for their own state, Iraq
may very well split along ethnonational lines. If, however, Iraq’s Sunnis, Shias, and
Kurds are competing over the single entity of the Iraqi state, much as they have done
throughout the country’s history, it is possible democracy can come to channel these
conflicts through generally peaceful political institutions.
In my view, a better understanding of Iraq and its peoples’ identity goes beyond
the common artificial explanations and looks to the state’s legacy of poor leadership and
an exclusionary political system. According to Stansfield:
While…there is now competition between (and often within) groups for power in
the post-2003 period over who controls the state, the struggles at the beginning of
the twentieth century can more accurately be described as conflict between
communal groups and the state.57
The leaders of the nascent Iraqi state sought to control the population by promoting
religious, ethnic, or tribal identities, and favoring certain segments of society as fit their
goals. The consequent weakening of Iraqis’ civic identities remains problematic today,
particularly in the aftermath of a war and the creation of a democratic process in which
sectarian and ethnic identities have gained resonance.
Great Britain was awarded the mandate for Iraq by the League of Nations in 1920.
This mandate was to continue until the state was capable of self-sufficiency, an
ambiguous deadline that assumed Great Britain would guide Iraq into political and
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economic modernity. According to Thabit A.J. Abdullah, the mandate “…was a bitter
blow to the country’s embryonic national leadership which had hoped for a rapid move to
independence.”58 Furthermore, each of the new state’s provinces had a strong rural-urban
divide and distinct realms of political and economic influence. For example, Basra was a
distinct entity before the British invaded in 1914-1915 due to its proximity to the Gulf
and trading networks with India and Iran. Baghdad, on the other hand, had cultural and
economic ties to Persia and Instanbul, while Mosul was affiliated with present-day
Syria.59 Abdullah argues further that “[o]f all the Ottoman provinces in the Middle East,
those in Iraq had demonstrated a strong resistance to centralized rule.”60
A degree of Iraqi nationalism did exist in the period following the mandate, due
largely to the continued British presence and its seeming interference in the new state’s
affairs. Consequently, Iraqi nationalists worked to rid the state of British control and to
exercise political decisions free from Britain’s system of advisors. According to Eric
Davis, “Although confessional differences had begun to appear, opposition to the British
was still sufficient to override them.”61 This frustration and unity of purpose led to the
Revolution of 1920, a large-scale uprising against the British in which all of Iraq’s
communities participated.62 The uprising was evidence that Iraq’s communities, if
properly motived, could unite and perceived themselves as a distinct entity being violated
by a foreign power.
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Still, sectarian divisions did influence the rebellion. For example, many powerful
Sunnis held back their support anticipating that a successful ouster of the British would
give the Shias power. Shia tribal leaders who had taken advantage of British patronage
and owned large properties similarly resisted the rebellion in fear of what a new political
order would bring. Finally, Kurds did not become involved and were hesitant of the
prospect of an Iraqi state likely led exclusively by Arabs.63 Many Iraqis disliked the
British, but the state and its resources and institutions were an object of competition for
which Iraqis divided themselves largely along communal lines.
Despite the Iraqis’ frustration, the revolution was put down by Great Britain and
Iraq remained under British control until 1932. The number of fatalities and war
weariness at home led Great Britain to reassess its relationship with the new state and
take steps to ease the tensions, including establishing a provisional government. They put
the respected Sunni religious scholar and shaykh, Abdul-Rahman al-Gailani, as head, and
filled the other positions mostly with Sunnis. Even so, Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias continued
to find some areas for cooperation, as elites from both groups agreed on the creation of an
Arab Islamic state with a monarchy and constitution.64 Kurds were largely excluded from
these debates, but there existed hope that an equitable and representative system could be
created.
The British deliberated among themselves over who should best lead Iraq.
According to Dawisha, “divisions were so deep that when it came to choosing a ruler for
the new state, the British realized that no local candidate could command the support of
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the whole population.”65 Consequently, they offered the throne to Faisal bin al-Hussein,
son of Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, leader of the 1916 Arab Revolt against the
Ottoman Empire. Faisal had assisted Great Britain in the Arab Revolt, believing he would
be rewarded with control of an independent Syria. However, Britain had also guaranteed
France jurisdiction over Syria through a competing treaty known as the Sykes-Picot
Agreement. A declaration of Syrian independence by Faisal and other representatives in
March 1920 was met with French resistence, and Britain chose to support its European
ally rather than uphold the earlier agreement with Hussein and Faisal. The French army
defeated Faisal in July 1920, and the new king was banished.66
The British might have selected Faisal for the Iraq position because they felt a
sense of guilt over their decision to defend the French claim. More importantly, however,
Faisal was “a man who had come to terms with the British presence in the Middle
East,”67 and thus was seen as a dependable source of stability. Additionally, he was a
candidate supported by Britain’s Iraq allies. Faisal took power on August 23, 1921, after
a referendum that boasted 96 percent of Iraqis accepted his appointment, a figure that was
highly manipulated by the British.68
The 1925 constitution created a two-chamber parliament with elections, an
independent judiciary, and a king who could exercise veto powers over any legislative
decisions. The parliament was hardly representative, however, due to the questionable
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legitimacy of the elections and the control exercised by powerful tribal leaders.69 In all,
the biggest obstacle to political development in Iraq during this period was the inability
of the central government to exercise authority over the entire country, coupled with a
strong sense of separateness among the former Ottoman provinces. While Baghdad had
long been a center of trade and culture, the fact that 80 percent of Iraqis lived in the
countryside had no sense of an Iraqi national identity detracted from it being perceived as
a legitimate administrative capital.
Great political change led to a flux in traditional roles, spurred further by new
market relationships and social interactions. The role of intellectuals was important
during this period, as they encouraged a shift from an identity “grounded in religion,
confessionalism, and traditional families to one based on education, technical expertise,
and secular values.”70 In line with Western ideas, the elites advocated loyalty to the
newly created nation-state and its institutions as opposed to traditional devotion to the
Islamic community, emphasizing the importance of secular education and scientific
progress. In general, however, a deeper allegiance to the state was limited mainly to
educated, urban government officials and military members, as well as local landowners
and wealthy elites who looked to the state for security and support. As Marr writes, “for
the most part, this was a small, thin, mainly Sunni strata, and identification with the state
was based more on patronage than positive fealty.”71
Tribal relationships retained their significance and further prevented the creation
of a civic identity that encompassed all Iraqis. Historically, tribal confederations known
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as qabilas have formed an important part of many Iraqis’ identities, and most Iraqis can
trace their familial ties to one of the nine qabila in place since the seventeenth century.72
The British sustained tribal identity by creating laws that “privileged the ruling tribal
stratum,”73 including the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation incorporated into
the 1925 constitution. This law awarded loyal shaykhs administrative powers, including
the collection of taxes, over their territories. By balancing competing forces against each
other, these policies helped the British to maintain control and stem potential challenges
to their rule.
According to Martin Bunton, the British colonialists left a “primordialising
legacy” in Iraq by allying themselves with tribal leaders.74 These leaders were seen as
conservative and thus capable of ensuring social stability with little cost to the Great
Britain. Many Shia realized their wellbeing was best secured by aligning with the central
state and thus cooperated with these policies as well. However, both Sunni and Shia
worked with the government based on their communal identities rather than their
identities as Iraqis. Collaboration between the two communities took place in an
environment where each was competing against the other for an increased share of state
resources and political influence, a rivalry in which the Sunni usually prevailed.
Sunni dominance in the new government and administration became more
pronounced over time. Britain’s inclusion of a limited number of Shia was largely
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nominal, and they held no real power. Furthermore, many Shia ulama who had
participated in the 1920 uprising were banished to Iran, depriving the community of its
religious and moral leaders. As a result, “Shia resentment at being excluded from the
reins of power increased.”75 Though the majority of the population, Shias were
underrepresented and remained so throughout the monarchy and the republic. This legacy
of Sunni dominance and Shia bitterness remained an unsettled issue and became a source
of conflict particularly during the transition to democracy after 2003.
Historically, Sunni Arabs were favored under the Ottoman Empire and held the
majority of its administrative positions. Furthermore, Sunnis formed the largest group in
Iraq’s urban areas and thus were closer to the centers of power. The decision by the
British to continue this trend reflected the fact that Sunnis were better educated and
attended the modern state schools established in the area during the late 19th century. In
contrast, most Shia had traditional educations from religiously-based schools. As Marion
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett write, “…when the Iraqi state was created in 1920,
there were few qualified Shia able or willing to take part either in the leadership of the
government or in the administration.”76 The Iraqi government, influenced by Great
Britain, became comparably reliant on a narrow sector of the population for its power.
Years of Ottoman favoritism towards the Sunni followed by similar British
policies led many Shias to look to their own community for social and political direction.
The Shia religious system and its recognized clerical leadership meant the group has
historically had more distinct and self-serving institutions and a distinguishable
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counteridentity.77 For example, Shias had separate courts, aid institutions, and other
administrative organizations. It remains the case, however, that Sunnis and Shias lived in
the same neighborhoods and often cooperated for business purposes. Additionally,
according to Abdullah, Shias in Iraq embraced their Arab heritage and thus separated
themselves from the Shia of neighboring Iran.78 Sources of unity were present, but were
little encouraged by Iraq’s leaders or its political system.
The state also marginalized its Kurdish population, most noticeably in the new
leaders’ decision to establish Arabic as the language of the state and education. This had
further implications for overall Iraqi identity, and according to Marr, “tended to open the
door to a broader Arab identity, rather than one focused simply on the new state.”79 The
tension between loyalty to the Iraqi state versus the larger Arab world was to remain an
issue throughout Iraq’s development, and shaped the formation of the population’s
identity for years to come. For the Kurdish case, in particular, it led them to look to their
fellow Kurds, including those in neighboring states, rather than other Iraqis.
The state’s lack of economic development during this formative period affected
its citizen’s identities, as most Iraqis remained outside the formal economy until at least
the oil boom of the 1950s. Consequently, the existence of:
…a landholding class and a small urban elite, which controlled both wealth and
power, left the bulk of the population without the ‘stake in society’ that supports
identification with the state and its government.80

77

Marr, “One Iraq or Many,” 17.
Abdullah, Dictatorship, 8.
79
Marr, “One Iraq or Many,” 20.
80
Marr, “One Iraq or Many,” 22.
78

39

Individuals and groups that were excluded politically were also marginalized
economically, leading to deeper frustrations with the status quo. Again, this situation
served to encourage more narrow relationships and fewer linkages among Iraqis from
different regions.
Marr argues that the initial period after Iraq’s creation was “a missed opportunity
to create a new identity grounded on a multiethnic, multisectarian basis.”81 The expansion
of the central government’s power over distinct regions and the establishment of a
parliamentary system and monarchy brought various segments of society into the state
apparatus to a limited extent. However, the leaders were ultimately unsuccessful in this
regard: “Iraq’s political class could have put more focus, over time, on these new
institutions to embed them in the public consciousness and make them part of Iraq’s new
identity,”82 and according to Marr, this was not adequately done. The state building
project failed to involve the Kurds, Shia, and those Sunnis unconnected by patronage to
the central government.
Increased contact with the West during this period offered new political
philosophies and understandings of group relations, including the concept of nationalism.
Consequently, the possibility of an identity based on shared language gained followers in
this time of transition. Pan-Arabism emerged as an alternative to either sectarian or statebased identity. According to Abdullah, pan-Arabism:
was primarily a reaction to colonial rule. It argued that modern Iraq, along with
the rest of the Arab countries, was an artificial creation. Its natural identity could
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not be separated from that of a single Arab nation stretching from Morocco to the
Persian Gulf.83
In this view, separate countries joined by language and history were to unite territorially
and politically to regain strength in a post-colonial world.
As Davis writes, “It was this tension between continuity and change that helps
explain the rise of two competing definitions of political community, one Iraqist
nationalist and one Pan-Arab, that began to vie for hegemony.”84 Iraqists, or those in
favor of a narrower, state-based identity, were not opposed to relations with other Arab
states, but placed greater emphasis on finding solutions to Iraq’s political and economic
problems. Pan-Arabists, on the other hand, relegated domestic problems to the goal of
Arab unity.85 The controversy over pan-Arabism versus state-based, Iraqi identity
similarly influenced other Arab countries struggling with how best to gain power in a
largely post-colonial world.
Identity based solely on the Iraqi state generally attracted Shia, Kurds, and
religious minorities. Conversely, pan-Arabism tended to appeal to Iraq’s tribal
constituents, as the ideology was perceived to be reminiscent of the early Islamic empires
and their communities of believers. Writes Davis, “Similar to tribal members who
focused on blood ties rather than spatial location, the Pan-Arabists substituted ethnic
purity for a more precise territorial definition of space.”86. This put Iraq’s communities at
odds over the nature of the state. First, the Kurds were not Arab, and they might have
better responded to an identity based on Iraq’s territory. Second, Shia, though Arab,
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disliked the secular focus of Arab nationalism with its Sunni underpinnings and were
fearful of a unified Arab state in which they would be a minority.87
Despite these challenges, some of Iraq’s early leaders made a concerted effort to
foster national unity. Under Faisal’s guidance in particular, important educational and
cultural policies were put in place to encourage a unified Iraqi state. As Hala Mundhir
Fattah and Frank Caso write, “Perhaps the one monarch who really tried to bridge the
sectarian, ethnic, and political divisions in the early years was Faisal I.”88 He did so by
training talented Shia for government positions and gave them responsibilities in the new
state, and by ensuring that the established quotas were filled with members of the
Kurdish community. While many participants in this project considered themselves Arab
nationalists first, they believed state and Arab loyalty mutually enforcing, for “all the
nationalist notions of love of country, a feeling of community, and a sense of
togetherness, could be nurtured within the political boundaries of Iraq.”89 To these
thinkers, a well-functioning state would benefit the Iraqi population and allow Iraq an
important role in the Arab world.
The monarchy under Faisal’s successors, Ghazi I and Faisal II, continued to foster
support across Iraq’s sectarian and economic groups. They tended to focus, however, on
the most powerful tribes and families. Sunnis also resisted any meaningful inclusion of
other groups and a potential loss of their privileged position. This prevented Iraq’s
government from being truly representative. Fattah and Caso write: “…the Iraqi
state…continued to rely on a narrow sector of the populace that formed the pillars of state
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rule, the ex-Sharifians and the tribal shaykhs.”90 Sunni control extended even into
provincial governments in Shia-majority districts91 Again, these policies fostered narrow
and paternalistic identities rather than an inclusive understanding of Iraqi citizenry such
as required for a participatory political system.
In the last period of the monarchy, from 1946 to 1958, both Kurds and Shia had
made important gains despite their continued underrepresentation. Multiple prime
ministers were Kurdish or Shia, and the Kurds also fielded an important Minister of
Interior.92 The army, parliament, and political parties were largely pluralist and offered
promise for a more inclusive state. Unfortunately, most of these institutions came to
reaffirm the importance of close connections with the ruling elite. As Fattah and Caso
write, “for many national groups, loyalty to the Iraqi state was cultivated on the level of
personalized ties, and relations between the emergent state and its constituents were
shaped first and foremost by the growth of political patronage.”93 This further
strengthened the tribal Sunni elements at the expense of Iraq’s other communities.
This period further highlighted the dominance of the Sunni in Iraq’s political
system and the implications this situation had for sectarian divisions. According to
Dawisha, “…while the political fortunes of the Shia and, to a lesser extent, the Kurds
varied from one period to the other, Sunni dominance over the political power structure
was not challenged.”94 For example, between 1921 and 1936, only 5 out of 57 ministers
were either Shia or Kurdish. In the monarchy period, until 1958, the prime minister and
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ministers of defense, interior, finance, and foreign affairs were held nearly exclusively by
Sunnis. This bias extended into positions of military leadership as well.95 The attainment
of political power on the basis of sectarian identity served to highlight these divisions and
frustrate the Shia and Kurdish populations.
Political instability did not change the overwhelming preponderance of tribal and
kinship identity as a marker of political power. Between the state’s creation and the end
of the monarchy ten elections took place and over fifty cabinets were assembled. This did
little to bring new interests or voices to the political process. As Abdullah writes,
“Rarely…did these interruptions represent anything more than a reshuffling of posts.”96
The tendency for personal connections to trump meritocratic considerations continued
even as the state bureaucracy expanded and the central government was able to exert
more influence on the periphery.
This situation made it difficult for any Iraqis to view themselves as citizens of a
unified state rather than members of ethnic and sectarian groups. According to Marion
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett:
…while presumably intending to promote the formation of an integrated nationstate, the governments under the mandate and monarchy in fact helped to
reconstruct and perpetuate pre-capitalist and tribal relations through their tribal
and land tenure policies.97
Rather than reducing tribal identities, a phenomenon that began under the Ottomans, the
British strengthened these ties and reduced the likelihood that the general population
would identity with the state and its institutions. This situation created “the most
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wretched future for the masses of the landless, impoverished tribesmen and peasants who
suffered under the shaykhs’ whims,”98 thus depriving many of Iraq’s communities both
economically and politically.
A lack of economic development caused further discontent with the state and its
representatives. Though oil revenues greatly increased during the 1950s, most resulting
economic progress benefited the already prosperous landholders and other clients of the
state. As Martin Bunton writes, “The result was greater patrimonialism: the state in fact
became increasingly autonomous from the people and dependent on the interests of local
elites and foreign companies, while ignoring the underlying poverty and inequity.”99
Increased separation between the center and the majority of Iraqis who lived on the
margins of state influence meant communities and regions remained disconnected from
and unaffected by elite gains.
In 1968, after a series of coups and transfers of power, members of the Baath
political party took control under Abdul Rahman Aref’s regime and named Ahmad
Hassan al-Bakr president. The Revolutionary Command Council, a group controlled by
the Tikriti tribe and belonging exclusively to the Talfah clan, became the new center of
power. Though unpopular at first, the Baathists succeeded in passing social and economic
programs that reached the peasants, young people, and members of trade unions. Amidst
this increase in power, Saddam Hussein became president of the Revolutionary
Command Council and consequently of Iraq in 1979.100
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The ideology of Baathism was developed in Syria during the 1940s and centered
on pan-Arab populism. Its proponents argued for the reunification of the Arab world to
regain its historical destiny, a political philosophy filled with “references to an idealized
and romanticized notion of the past.”101 Pan-Arabism’s appeal in Iraq was limited largely
to the Sunni upper and middle classes, as they formed the majority of the urban
populations, Baathists’ traditional centers of power. Additionally, the majority of the
Arab world is Sunni, and Sunnis in Iraq saw their interests better served by joining in
such a confederation. Their lack of support from other segments of the Iraqi population
did not prevent the increasingly powerful Baathists from legitimizing their rule and
silencing any opposition through calls to the interests of the Arab nation.102
In the early Baath period, from 1968 to 1979, its leaders worked to modernize the
economy, improve medical care and education, and build a strong middle class. Marr
writes that “this trend…facilitated the erosion of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal
identities.”103 In addition, urbanization accelerated, increasing by 30 percent over a thirty
year period to 65 percent of the population in 1977. This brought a greater number of
Iraqis, both urban and rural, into the state market. Despite continued Sunni dominance in
state affairs, Shia businessmen were increasingly prosperous and more Shia gained
technical expertise through expanded education104 Shia experienced less economic
marginalization during this time, but were still highly underrepresented politically.
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The late seventies were thus characterized by increasing regime support from
wider segments of society, including Sunnis, Christians, and many educated Shias. As
Davis writes:
This was due in large measure to a deceptive political calm; the creation of a
general welfare state; massive infrastructural development, including roads,
electrification of villages, and new housing complexes; and the nationalization of
foreign oil.105
Still, much of the seemingly prosperous economy was tied heavily to the state and thus
available to government exploitation. This led to insecurity on the part of many Iraqis,
and a sense of suspicion toward the state and its institutions.106 Clear ties to the
government and membership in the appropriate tribes were most crucial in securing
inclusion in the state and the accompanying material benefits.
The Baathist state worked to mask tensions through a project of identity focused
on Mesopotamianiasm. Baathist leaders pointed to Iraq’s ancient civilizations as evidence
of its rightful place in the Arab world and thus of the pride to which its citizens were
rightfully entitled. The emphasis on this identity as opposed to the narrower Arab
construction also served to minimize Iraq’s sectarian differences, for “Iraq’s
Mesopotamian heritage was the only heritage to which all Iraqis – Sunni and Shia Arabs,
Kurds, and other minorities alike – could unambiguously relate.”107 Though the ancient
past was indeed a source of unity for all Iraq’s communities, there was no effort to take
concrete steps towards greater inclusion and the political reality remained unchanged.
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Tribalism had lessened in influence by the mid-20th century, and the Baath party
originally attempted to hasten this process, believing it harmful to Iraq’s transition to
modernity. However, party leaders reversed their original position during the 1980s and
1990s and promoted tribal solidarity to maintain the regime’s hold on power amidst war
and economic hardship.108 In pursuit of this goal:
…the Baath moved to appropriate folk culture and establish itself as the true
representative of mass interests. To accomplish this, the regime used folklore to
demonstrate values, norms, and cultural preferences that were distinctly Iraqi.109
The membership of the Baath Party also underwent a shift, as army officers and
intellectuals were replaced by individuals from the lower middle class whose identity was
based largely on tribal relations.
Saddam was particularly influential in this development, as he portrayed himself
supreme shaykh of Iraq to gain political capital. Though Saddam “sought to play down
public consciousness and discussions of tribalism and confessionalism in Iraqi politics
and society,”110 he realized its attractiveness in a populace still very much traditional.
This ploy was especially effective in gaining support from Iraq’s rural areas. Lastly,
tribalism was expedient in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war as Saddam implemented
symbols from the famed Battle of Qadisiya, in which Islam armies defeated Persia in 636,
to rally Iraqis. Despite economic and political progress, Saddam undertook a deliberate
identity-building project that returned people to their most basic understandings of the
nation and its cultural ties.
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Donald Malcolm Reid engages in an interesting study of Iraqi postage stamps to
portray Saddam’s ongoing manipulation of Iraqi identity for his regime’s purposes. He
writes: “Iraqi postage stamps provide a significant gauge of the images that Saddam
Hussein wanted to project and of Iraq’s turbulent political course through the twentieth
century.”111 For example, stamps depict Saddam as a military leader going into battle
against Iran, a father comforting a child, a Muslim traveling to Mecca, and a
traditionally-dressed Arab leader. These images reflect the importance of symbols in
Saddam’s Iraq and the role they played in promoting a particular identity depending upon
the regime’s aims. Saddam’s picture was increasingly visible in public displays and the
media during this time as well, serving to increase loyalty to him and emotional bonds to
the Baathist party.
As the Baathist’ use of tribalism was focused largely on the segments most
closely related to its own Sunni base of power, the Shia community was further alienated.
According to Davis:
Sunni Arab Iraqis, particularly those drawn from the rural tribal nexus upon
which the Takriti Ba’th based its power, enjoyed privileged access to the state –
including its administrative arm, the cultural bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps,
the military, the police, and the security services – by virtue of being a member of
this ethnic group.112
Shias did gain power, but as individuals rather than a constituency. Furthermore, Shias
required well-connected Sunnis to retain their positions and to gain additional power.
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Bunton links the regime’s increasing use of symbology to produce support to the
reality of economic hardship and the challenges it posed for the system of patronage. He
writes:
As the distributive ability of the regime diminished and material rewards came to
be confined to ever smaller circles of the regime’s core supporters, themselves
becoming defined in cultural terms rather than in programmatic, ideological or
civic terms, its reliance on religious, ethnic and cultural factors in its relationship
to wider sectors of the population would only grow.113
The identity-building project was not accompanied by any development in the political or
economic spheres, however, and thus failed to meaningfully incorporate those segments
of the population Saddam was attempting to co-opt. Though many urban Shias had
benefited from the prosperity of the 1970s, the wars of the 1980s and 1990s and Iraq’s
ensuing economic crisis made such patronage much rarer.
The Iran-Iraq war was an important point in the formation of Iraqi identity, as the
majority of Iraqi citizens’ support of their state seemed to trump ethnosectarian
considerations. Most Shia fought with Iraq, and many Kurds also joined the fight. Davis
argues:
These two elements – the ability of Iraqis from all ethnic groups to work together
in what is probably the most complex of human activities, war making, and the
demonstration of their commitment to Iraqi nationalism – should dispel the idea
that Iraq is an artificial nation-state.114
Iraqi elites capitalized on this sentiment, emphasizing the unity of Shia and Sunni Arabs
in the defeat of Persian infidels. The war also marked an attempt by Saddam and his
regime to promote Islam as a unifying identity. In a break with the secular ideology of
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Baathism, Saddam held Islamic conferences and was photographed at religious sites to
portray his regime as in line with Islamic values and religiously legitimated.115
However, it cannot be denied that the time leading up to the war was
characterized by increasing frustration with the Baathist state on the part of the Shia,
Kurds, and other opposition movements. The eight-year conflict left 400,000 Iraqis dead
or wounded and cost the country an estimated $128 billion, with between $100 and $120
billion in foreign debt.116 Great economic hardship in the form of high inflation and
unemployment only furthered the processes of political and social repression. Middle
class Iraqis suffered the worst, as their wages were decimated by the inflation.117
Saddam’s regime also suffered as it was no longer able to provide the services
through which it had engendered support. The regime pursued economic liberalization
policies during this time as well, which only intensified the gap in wealth and accentuated
the division between those close to the centers of power and those on the edges. The
government put rations in place in an attempt to deal with the adversity, but this merely
allowed them to reward certain groups for their loyalty and thus hardened the ethnic and
sectarian lines already apparent. Since the state was increasingly unable to provide
economic benefits, many Iraqis looked within their smaller communities of tribe or
family to gain jobs and other needed welfare services.118
Oil prices dropped dramatically during 1990 and reduced Iraq’s annual revenues
by nearly $7 billion. Saddam responded to such hardship by accusing Kuwait and the
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United Arab Emirates of intentionally exporting more than their quotas under OPEC and
thus driving the price down. He also alleged that Kuwait had illegally drilled from Iraqi
wells near their shared border. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait began on August 2, 1990, and
was condemned nearly immediately by the United Nations Security Council. Coalition
forces liberated Kuwait on February 28, 1991, soon after the launch of Operation Desert
Storm.119
In addition to further economic sanctions, Saddam was faced by a March 1991
revolt of all of the northern Kurdish-dominated and southern Shia-dominated provinces.
Though President George Bush had called for the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam
during the coalition’s campaign, help never materialized and Saddam’s military defeated
the fractured and unorganized opposition.120 The crackdown by the Republic Guard
resulted in many casualties and a mass exodus of Kurds to Iran and Turkey and Shia to
Saudi Arabia. Only after threat of U.S. military action did Iraq forces withdraw from their
campaign of atrocity. As a result, the U.S., United Kingdom, and France created
protected havens in the north, for the Kurds, Turkmen, and other small minorities, and in
the south, for mostly Shia Arabs.121
While Saddam had attempted to promote his government as meritocratic and Iraq
as unified, the regime’s handling of the Shia and Kurdish rebellions in 1991 greatly
changed his rhetoric. According to Dawisha, “Saddam would no longer feel the need to
apologize for a brazenly ethnosectarian rule centered on family, clan, and tribe from his
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own Sunni heartland.”122 As evidence, he blamed the 1991 Intifada on a “foreign
conspiracy…intended to undermine Iraq’s national identity, as well as its collective mind,
conscience, and sensitivities.”123 He also accused Iraq’s minorities of causing Turkish
and Iranian intrusions in modern times, and thus further threatening the state. It was
during this time that support of any association opposed to Baathism became a crime
punishable by death.124
Davis summarizes the effect of Saddam’s heightened rhetoric towards Iraq’s nonSunni communities:
In referring to ‘the enemies of Iraq and the Arabs,’ Saddam pit[ted] urban Sunni
and tribal Arabs against the Shia and non-Arabs. In using the Sunni Arab
community’s values and history as a standard by which to measure all other
ethnic groups, Saddam asserts that, at its core, Iraq is a Sunni Arab state.125
These comments engendered Saddam to poorer segments of the Sunni community, who
appreciated his praise of tribal culture and values. Additionally, “...the Iraqi leader’s
arguments were intended to reinforce fears that Iraq could break apart if marginal groups
acquired political power.”126 Such a sentiment had a number of adherents from among the
Shia and Kurdish middle classes, too, as they feared the economic and social instability
that might occur if a major political shift were to occur.
The state was vital in appropriating resources and controlling who had access to
goods and services during this period of economic hardship. Accordingly, over 16 million
Iraqis were dependent on the assistance of the regime. Saddam used this control to
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reward loyalty, seizing the property of individuals he saw as a threat to the regime and
then redistributing them largely to members of the Sunni provinces’ tribes. As Abdullah
writes, “In the absence of many state services, people resurrected old social institutions
such as tribes or various other communal networks for support. Sectarianism and
tribalism received encouragement from the state, especially after the 1991 uprising.”127
This served to increase competition and consequently identification along ethnic and
sectarian lines.
At the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraqis were living under a repressive
police state with little hope of political progress or economic improvement. Most
important for the democracy-building project the U.S. was about to embark on, most of
Iraq’s population looked to sources other than the state for economic and social support.
This did not include a select segment of the Sunni community, whose favored status
under Saddam by virtue of being members of his clan gave them the most to lose with
regime change. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett conclude:
Sectarianism, localism, and other forms of communal solidarity were reinforced
largely because the powerlessness of the individual vis-à-vis an arbitrary political
system...had the effect of forcing men and women to resort to ‘pre-state’ networks
of sect, locality, or family.128
Though the state had been in existence for over 80 years, most Iraqis were not much
closer to an Iraq-based loyalty than their ancestors had been at the beginning of Faisal’s
nation-building endeavors.
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Iraq is indeed divided along sectarian lines, but this is due less to the existence of
primordial identities and ancient hatreds than political and social authoritarianism and
economic hardship. As Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett wrote in 1991, in Iraq:
…patriarchal values and ties of family, clan, locality, tribe, and sect continue to
be reproduced, since the existence of a highly dictatorial and repressive regime
for more than two decades has operated against their disintegration.129
These conditions prevented the formation of a unified, civic-based identity despite
decades of shared territory and the presence of basic bureaucratic institutions. The
tensions among communities after years of competition over limited state resources and
political power came to the fore with the removal of Saddam and his regime and a greater
deal of freedom than had been experienced in generations.
However, historically there have been no indications that Iraq’s Shias, Kurds, or
Sunnis desire independent states as opposed to a greater share of power and resources
within the existing territorial boundaries. While it can be argued that most individuals in
the state do consider themselves Iraqis, it is also the case that at times other identities
have had greater salience depending on the government’s ability to provide
representation and goods and services. Dawisha argues:
For the national idea to compete with sub-national particularistic loyalties, the
state has to literally woo the citizens away from their ethnosectarian comfort
zone. The state needs to show that the interests of the citizen will be served best
(and sometimes exclusively) by the state, not the tribe, clan, sect, or region.130
It is in this context that the processes of institution building and democratic government
play an important role. Though democracy in Iraq has faced countless challenges so far, a
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political system based on the representation of all interests and equality under the law
may offer the best hope of an inclusive and stable state.
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CHAPTER FOUR: U.S. MISTAKES POST-2003
Iraq’s history of poor governance and non-representative institutions created deep
obstacles to democratization. The United States’ invasion of the country and subsequent
decision-making in many ways worsened the already challenging environment. The
question of whether or not the U.S. should have invaded Iraq will not be addressed here,
though the mistakes made by policymakers lead one to conclude that the U.S. was
unprepared for the challenges to come regardless of original intent. An analysis of Iraq’s
experiences with conflict and identity politics following Saddam’s removal and the role
of American policies in contributing to such experiences is important in understanding
the state’s continued challenges. Yet it can still be concluded that despite nearly a decade
of intersectarian and political struggles, most actors have decided to participate in the
democratic processes in Iraq thus enhancing its legitimacy.
The period immediately following the U.S. invasion was characterized by wide
challenges related to institution building, infrastructure repair, and the provision of health
services, education, and other social needs. Larry Diamond summarizes the dramatic
difficulties:
The state as an institution had to be restructured and revived. Basic services had
to be restored, infrastructure repaired, and jobs created. Fighting between
disparate ethnic, regional, and religious groups – many of them with well-armed
militias – had to be prevented or preempted. The political culture of fear, distrust,
brutal dominance, and blind submission had to be transformed. Political parties
and civil society organizations working to represent citizen interests, rebuild
communities, and educate for democracy had to be assisted, trained, and
57

protected. A plan needed to be developed to produce a broadly representative and
legitimate new government, and to write a new constitution for the future political
order. And sooner or later, democratic elections would need to be held.131
The United States did not adequately plan for such hardships, and its mishandling
contributed to a decade of sectarian and other conflict that continue to challenge Iraq’s
democratic transition. The lack of preparation by the U.S. also created Iraqi resentment
toward attempts to promote stability and democracy.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the architects of the U.S. invasion did not
fully grasp the challenges that lay ahead concerning Iraq’s sectarian divisions. Thabbit
Abdullah argues, for example, that “hardly anyone understood the culture, history, or
socio-political complexity of the country.”132 As shown in the previous section, divisions
along sectarian and tribal lines were still prevalent in the early 21st century, a situation
worsened by economic and social hardship, and in particular, decades of totalitarian rule.
More specifically, U.S. policymakers did not adequately consider how the loss of power
on the part of Sunnis would lead to resistance to both American efforts and the
democratic project in general. This miscalculation led to conflict and instability,
especially on the part of Sunnis who were increasingly worried about their interests under
a Shia-led government.
Numerous scholars have also drawn attention to the shortened time frame within
which many decisions regarding the invasion were made. While the Pentagon began
formally planning the attack on Iraq in November 2001, few calculations extended
beyond the initial invasion and taking of Baghdad. According to Thomas E. Ricks, once
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the Bush administration realized many of its initial calculations were mistaken, it
“hurried its diplomacy, short-circuited its war planning, and assembled an agonizingly
incompetent occupation.”133 The haste with which many determinations were made was
again symptomatic of an inadequate awareness of Iraqi society and the challenges that
would likely arise. Furthermore, the administration largely failed to consult with those
most knowledgeable of the region or critics within or outside of the planning councils
who offered views contrary to its own.
The United States also incorrectly assumed that Iraq’s oil wealth would be
sufficient to fund the reconstruction of the country. Paul Wolfowitz, a leading architect of
the invasion, in particular believed Iraq’s oil wealth would pay for most of its postwar
rebuilding, estimating that soon after Saddam’s removal the state would generate $15-20
billion per year in exports.134 In making such predictions, the U.S. revealed it
underestimated the damage done to Iraq’s infrastructure and economic system after
decades of state mismanagement and international sanctions. The Iraqi economy had for
years been based largely on ties to Saddam and the central government, providing
individuals and businesses limited experience with the market or international economy.
Iraq’s sectarian divisions and potential problems were compounded by the threats
the invasion posed to the middle class that crossed and linked communities, a point made
by Abdullah. He notes that the Iraqi middle class has “historically been most supportive
of a secular Iraqi nationalist outlook,” and thus an identity beyond simple sectarian
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divisions.135 The middle class’s struggles began with the economic downturn of the
1980s and worsened under sanctions. The tumult of the post-2003 period further
damaged their standing and led many to flee the country, removing a major source of
stability and potential assistance in the state’s reconstruction.
In terms of military action, the troop levels placed in Iraq were not sufficient to
secure order after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Policymakers and members of the military
assumed the conflict would be short, with no need for a long-term commitment of troops
or resources.136 Ricks draws particular attention to this deficit, noting: “The irony is that
in eighteen months of planning, the key question was left substantially unaddressed: what
to do after getting Baghdad.”137 Many within the administration believed that after the
invasion most of Iraq’s political institutions would remain in place, with the only change
being to those in positions of power. As such, few plans were made in terms of how to
provide security and services in absence of a functioning and cooperative Iraqi
government.
Ricks analyzes the failures of the American occupation of Iraq by pointing to
three false assumptions on which the plan was based. First, planners believed large
numbers of Iraqi security forces were willing and able to support the occupation. Though
a few exiled Iraqis gave advice to the U.S. in the lead up to the invasion, there was no
indication that others would similarly cooperate. Second, the Bush administration
assumed the international community would assist where their efforts were insufficient.
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According to Ricks, however, “it is not clear what this assumption was based on, given
the widespread and building opposition to the U.S. led invasion.”138 Finally, as mentioned
earlier, most post-invasion plans were founded on a belief that a new Iraqi government
would assemble and take over shortly after Saddam’s removal. U.S. policymakers did not
appreciate that the Iraqi government prior to the invasion consisted mainly of patronage
linkages based on one’s relation to Saddam and his favored tribes, with few modern
bureaucratic structures to sustain the state.
For example, American forces were stationed in urban areas with no
understanding of their duties or with who they needed to work. One consequence of this
planning failure was the spread of looting in the major cities following the invasion, an
unexpected scenario for which U.S. troops were unprepared. According to Kenneth M.
Pollack, “The result was an outbreak of lawlessness throughout the country that resulted
in massive physical destruction coupled with a stunning psychological blow to Iraqi
confidence in the United States, from neither of which has the country recovered.”139 The
U.S. mismanagement of this crisis signaled the security and political problems to come,
all seemingly stemming from a lack of understanding on the part of the Americans and
the consequent growing distrust of the project by the Iraqis.
More generally, there was little communication between Iraq and the U.S. in
terms of the latter’s goals and approaches and the former’s needs and concerns. Anthony
H. Cordesman argues that the post-invasion plan for the government, police, and military:
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…needed to be proclaimed before, during, and immediately after the initial
invasion to win the support of Iraqi officials and officers who were not linked to
active support of Saddam Hussein and past abuses, and to preserving the core of
governance that could lead to the rapid creation of both a legitimate government
and security.140
This included conveying to the Shia that they would gain power following elections, to
the Sunni that they would be included in the statebuilding project and protected from
persecution, and to the Kurds that their cooperation was vital in Saddam’s absence.141
Such plans would not have satisfied all concerned parties, but might have reduced some
uncertainty. It is possible, of course, that the U.S. itself was unsure how such political
development would proceed, reducing its ability to communicate such information to
Iraqi citizens.
The lack of participation by the United Nations and other international
organizations in much of the planning and post-invasion reconstruction was also a
contributing factor to the period’s security and political problems. According to Pollack:
The United Nations, through its various agencies, can call upon a vast network of
personnel and resources vital to various aspects of nation-building. One of the
greatest problems the United States faced was that it simply did not have enough
people who knew how to do all of the things necessary to rebuild the political and
economic systems of a shattered nation.142
The United Nations was experienced with post-conflict political reconstruction and
peacebuilding through its work in Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, and elsewhere, but
became frustrated by continued U.S. unilateralism in many of its decisions. In most cases
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the United States did not have the right people with adequate knowledge of how to
reconstruct Iraq both politically and economically while addressing its unique challenges.
Perhaps the most dramatic action with the most long-standing consequences was
the U.S. decision to undertake a de-Baathification campaign as part of Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No. 1 on May 16, 2003. This order proclaimed that no
member of the top four ranks of the Baath party could be a part of the new government,
putting 20-40,000 people out of work. F. Gregory Gause III notes:
Everyone agreed that it [the Order] would strip the new Iraqi government of the
experienced cadre of managers who had made the old one work. They just
disagreed on whether that was a good thing or not.143
For the American policymakers, de-Baathification was an important indication that
Saddam’s regime was gone and a new era in Iraqi political life had begun. Conversely,
de-Baathification removed the few people who had experience administering a state,
many of who were Baathist’ party members only for employment purposes. DeBaathification also strengthened many Iraqis’ feelings of uncertainty over their place in
the American-led transition.
Another contentious decision was the disbandment of the Iraqi military and
security services. It is true that many soldiers simply left, and it is unclear whether the
army would have been a major source of stability during the transition had it remained in
place.144 However, the Army, unlike forces loyal only to Saddam, was a national
institution that included members of all communities and thus might have provided some
constancy and reassurance to Iraqis concerned by the U.S. project. At a minimum, an
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attempt should have been made to negotiate with the Iraqi forces in hopes of including
them in the rebuilding efforts.145 Rather, the United States’ actions exemplified:
the failure to entice, cajole, or even coerce Iraqi soldiers back to their own
barracks or other facilities where they could be fed, clothed, watched, retrained,
and prevented from joining the insurgency, organized crime, or the militias.146
There was no attempt to train the former soldiers for employment and reintegration into
Iraqi society, frustrating them and increasing their distrust of the United States’ motives
and actions.
Both of these decisions imposed major changes on Iraqis already unsure of the
future and their position in the new state system. Though they might have supported
Saddam’s removal, many were worried by such drastic developments. Abdullah
summarizes:
…it is not too far-fetched to assume that the various security forces under Saddam
numbered in the region of 100,000 highly trained, well-connected individuals
with access to money and arms. As the allies swept through the country in 2003,
these Saddam-loyalists went underground and waited to see what the new order
held for them. [L. Paul] Bremer’s decision to abolish the army and the Baath party
settled the matter.147
Many went on to join the insurgency or other rebel forces, seeking to prevent other U.S.led changes that were seemingly being taken at the expense of average Iraqis.
Bremer, director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
and later the Coalition Provisional Authority, also set out on a process of economic
liberalization, believing the free market best suited to provide the economic development
Iraq so desperately needed. He started by eliminating unsuccessful state-run industries,
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intending to reduce state control of the economy and to allow markets to function.
However, “this had the political effect of further alienating the middle class, which
already had been hit by de-Baathification, and which was full of managers from those
inefficient industries.”148 Other decisions had similar outcomes, with the ending of
agricultural subsidies, for example, as an especially harsh blow to struggling rural Iraqis.
According to Eric Davis, these decisions suggested a lack of understanding on the part of
the Bush administration of how traditional Iraqis viewed the state and its obligations to its
citizens, and amounted to “shock therapy” to an already damaged society.149
As it became increasingly clear that an Iraqi democracy would not easily emerge,
the United States began work to establish basic political institutions. American officials
had wanted to cede control to the Iraqis as soon as possible, but it was apparent
democratic elections would not likely promote the U.S. interests of creating a stable and
supportive government. Consequently, in May 2003 the U.S. created the Coalitional
Provisional Authority (CPA) in hopes of restoring some political and economic order.
The CPA instituted a number of needed reforms and steps towards democracy, including
freedom of speech, association, and the press, and allowed room for the growth of nongovernmental organizations such as charities.150 Unfortunately, the political and military
divisions were largely American-led and thus viewed unfavorably and with suspicion by
the Iraqis, some of who increasingly considered the U.S. presence an occupation.151
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The CPA also effectively introduced a political system based on Iraq’s sectarian
divisions rather than a more unified Iraqi identity, an outcome that many analysts believe
has characterized Iraqi institutions since. According to Abdullah:
…the CPA’s simplistic understanding of Iraqi society as being essentially divided
into three antagonistic communities left its imprints on the reforms and tended to
deepen, rather than dampen, the rising ethno-sectarian mood.152
While its designers sought to ensure all Iraq’s communities were represented, the
formation of the CPA along ethnic and sectarian lines reinforced the divisions rather than
ameliorating them. The CPA also suffered from disorganization and incompetence,
making it a difficult partner for both the Iraqis and the American military leaders with
whom it was supposed to be allied.153
Increased pressure for a transfer of power to an Iraqi interim government led the
United States to appoint a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003.
Despite this development, “…Bremer made it clear that he would continue to exercise
supreme power.”154 Though the Americans sought to exercise power over the important
decisions the nascent Iraqi government was likely to make, it is possible their
micromanagement of the process actually preempted necessary political progress.
Diamond writes:
…the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq probably would have
proceeded much more rapidly and successfully – with far less violence – if the
United States had accepted UN appeals to transfer power early on to a broadbased Iraqi interim government chosen through a process of inclusive
participation and transparent consultation.155
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It is debatable whether the Iraqis were ready to govern so soon after authoritarian rule,
but U.S. control did not adequately involve the population in their new political system
and furthered perceptions that the project was an occupation.
Unsurprisingly, then, the IGC was mostly ineffective and distrusted. According to
Diamond:
The IGC was never able to agree on a formula for political transition, partly
because of its own deep internal divisions along philosophical, ethnic, and
sectarian lines; and partly because its members resented not having real power.156
Again, the creation of the IGC was based on a top-down approach that did not allow the
time necessary for government and political processes to build naturally and with
sufficient Iraqi participation. Pollack argues that this was to some extent due to an
American desire to put the Iraqis in charge and thus responsible for the inevitable
political and economic challenges.157 More generally, the formation of the IGC on
sectarian lines signaled to Shia parties such as Daawa and the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq that their partisan foundations were acceptable and perhaps
even expected.158
Many of the IGC’s problems were due to the lack of capable leaders truly
representative of the Iraqi people. This was partly a symptom of Saddam’s desire to
either coopt or eliminate any non-Baathist individuals who were effective and
endangered his grasp on power. Additionally, as Pollack writes:
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…because Washington had not allowed enough time – let alone created the
circumstances – for genuinely popular figures to emerge, the CPA simply
appointed twenty-five Iraqi leaders well-known to them.159
A few were recognized and respected in their communities, but some were completely
unfamiliar, and others largely disliked or even leaders of militias. This gap in leadership
did nothing to reassure the Iraqi people that their interests would be represented and
lobbied for in the new government.
IGC’s weaknesses also negatively affected subsequent Iraqi governments,
particularly in the spread of corruption and cronyism among new politicians. Many IGC
members used the new resources available to them to build up their own power and
security services at the expense of building a more effective, unitary state.160
Furthermore, and perhaps most damaging, “they used the instruments of government to
exclude their political rivals from gaining any economic, military, or political power,”161
strengthening the perception among Sunnis and others that the American-produced
democratic system would be Shia-dominated and dangerous to their interests. In many
Iraqis’ view, the new democracy was neither representative nor equitable, and to some, it
was threatening.
More specifically, the IGC included only one Sunni tribal leader, and his standing
within his community was questionable. The make-up and actions of the IGC, combined
with the process of de-Baathification, made it clear to Sunnis, and particularly those close
to Saddam, that their years in power had ended and the prospects of future political
dominance were bleak. As Pollack writes:
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All of these strategies had been previously employed by the Sunnis themselves
under Saddam; thus, the Sunnis became convinced that in the new Iraq they
would be oppressed just as they had once oppressed the Shia and the Kurds.162
A lack of hope for the future and distrust in the Shia and Kurds under the guidance of the
Americans led many Sunnis to resist other political progress or to join the growing
insurgency.
A plan for transition was subsequently created by the United States and more or
less imposed on the IGC. The plan, which came to be known as the November 15
Agreement, set the end of the political occupation at June 30, 2004. More specifically, the
IGC was to draft and adopt a “Transitional Administrative Law” by February 28th to
establish and structure power until a democratic government was elected under a
permanent constitution.163 Though advances towards a more representative and
autonomous government were needed, many viewed the timing considerations as based
more on the Bush administration’s desire to show progress during the 2004 American
presidential campaign than on the best interests of Iraq’s democracy.164
The November 15 Agreement originally specified that a 15-member Organizing
Committee representing all of Iraq’s 18 provinces would select members to a caucus. The
caucus would then elect members to a Transitional National Assembly, after which a
prime minister, cabinet, and three-member presidential council would be appointed. This
system allowed significant, though indirect, control of the government by the U.S. and its
Iraqi allies. However, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most revered figure in Shia
Islam and spiritual leader of the Iraqi Shia community, issued a fatwa in opposition to the
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plan.165 He argued that the constituent assembly had to be elected rather than appointed;
as is, the plan was “undemocratic and a plot to prevent the Shia from realizing their
rightful place in Iraqi society.”166 The U.S. reluctantly agreed to Sistani’s demands,
recognizing his weight in the Shia community.
The decision was made to implement a proportional representation electoral
system with a single nationwide district. This determination was based on a number of
factors, including the simplicity with which it could be implemented and an avoidance of
the question of districts and vote apportionment because of lack of census data.167 As part
of this system, voters were to choose political entities, whether parties, coalitions of
parties, or individuals.168 Though many criticized the complexity of the November 15
Agreement, its creators and supporters argued that the many stipulations were necessary
to achieve a representative body filled by popular Iraqis rather than exiles or militia
leaders.169
The question of the timing of Iraq’s first elections was also up for debate. There
was disagreement over whether postponing elections would allow more time for the
building of civil society and informal democratic institutions or rather, would further
delegitimize the present, unelected government. According to Diamond:
Ill-timed and ill-prepared elections do not produce democracy, or even political
stability, after conflict. Instead, they may only enhance the power of actors who
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mobilize coercion, fear, and prejudice, thereby reviving autocracy and even
precipitating large-scale violent strife.170
Conversely, delaying elections might further marginalize and perhaps radicalize those
who perceive themselves excluded from the government and thus the power to make
important decisions.
In the Iraqi case, elections were increasingly demanded as the means to transfer
power away from the U.S. and towards elected representatives. However, it can be
argued that insufficient time was allowed to prepare the Iraqi people for the processes of
electoral government and that the contests institutionalized many of the CPA and IGC’s
problems. The November 15 Agreement seemed to establish important political
development, but the quickness with which it was produced lessened its appeal to the
Iraqi people. Accordingly, “it was never vetted with a broad cross-section of Iraqi
society, and thus there was no sense among Iraqis of ownership of the new transition
plan.”171 These feelings did little to assuage Iraqi fears of an American occupation and
Sunni expectations of a system that would be dominated by Shia and Kurdish interests.
Iraq experienced increased sectarian violence in the lead up to elections, causing
many to question if the political contest would in fact stabilize the country and put it on
the path towards independent democracy. By 2005, for example, there was an average of
70 attacks per day.172 Most of the violence was on the part of local Sunni groups opposed
to the presence of the United States. Some Sunnis also joined al-Qaeda and fighters from
other countries who sought to capitalize on Iraqi instability and use the state as a base for
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its operations.173 Conflict attributable to anti-American sentiment increased among the
Shia community as well, especially among followers of the highly influential Shia cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr.174
Though violence was generally portrayed as intersectarian, Iraq’s communities
are not monolithic and fighting among communities was often accompanied by fighting
within them. Furthermore, despite the tendency of the United States to treat most Sunnis
as former Baathists and supporters of Saddam, many were glad to see him go yet
disappointed by the U.S. treatment of the Sunni population. Roel Meijer writes:
For although they had depended on the Baathist state to defend their interests,
many Sunnis also suffered under Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship and feel
deeply humiliated and dishonored by the collective punishment the United States
has meted out to their community.175
In many cases, conflict came about as a result of uncertainty, a situation worsened by the
inability of imperfect institutions and inadequate security to establish law and order and
reassurance for Iraq’s Sunnis.
There was excitement among large segments of the Iraqi population about the
upcoming elections despite these security challenges. Many of the newly formed political
parties participated in training and information programs designed to assist in the
transition and to encourage wide participation. However:
…the continuing terrorist and insurgent violence obstructed economic
reconstruction, eroded Iraqi confidence in the appointed Interim Government, and
raised serious doubts about the country’s capacity to stage elections by the
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January 31 deadline that would be sufficiently inclusive, transparent, fair, and free
of violence and intimidation to be considered ‘reasonably credible.’176
While the Shia and Kurdish communities were especially enthusiastic about the contests,
violence and urgent social and economic demands detracted from what was to be a
monumental moment in Iraq history. The prospects of creating a democracy in the midst
of pressing challenges and Sunni opposition were for many questionable.
Even so, elections to the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly took place on
January 30, 2005, along with elections to provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18
provinces and a regional assembly in Kurdistan. Over 7,000 candidates organized into
multi-party coalitions, single parties, and individuals competed for seats in the National
Assembly, and around 9,000 candidates in party slates looked to fill the provincial and
Kurdistan seats. According to the system of closed list proportional representation, any
slate that secured at least 31,000 votes, or around 1/275 of the vote, received a seat. As
intended, the elected Assembly appointed the presidency council composed of a president
and two deputies, a prime minister, and a cabinet.177
These elections witnessed a 58 percent participation rate among registered voters,
with the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly split largely among three blocs. The
largest bloc was the United Iraqi Alliance, formed by mostly Shia parties including the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, later known as the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq, and the Da’wah party. 178 The UIA slate included 15 supporters of
Muqtada al-Sadr despite his criticism of the U.S. initiated process, and eight of them won

176

Diamond, “Lessons from Iraq,” 12-13.
Katzman, “Iraq,” 1-2.
178
Dawisha and Diamond, “Iraq’s Year,” 93-94.
177

73

seats.179 The Kurdistan Alliance, a coalition of the two major Kurdish parties, came in
second, followed by the Iraqi List, a secular group led by interim prime minister Iyad
Allawi.180
The January 2005 election to the Transitional National Assembly was
consequently characterized by voting along ethnic lines and support for parties organized
by sect. In effect, the legislature was constituted much like the CPA and IGC. According
to some observers, the political lines established by the CPA and IGC were furthered by
the national nature of the elections and absence of district divisions. The elections then
“became almost purely a national-identity referendum, untempered by any local
component or flavor.”181 While the system avoided many of the complications associated
with the drawing of districts, it also served to incentivize support for the most widelyknown candidates. The elites who were best at mobilizing voters generally did so through
appeals to sect or ethnicity.
Although the election winners were almost exclusively Shia or Kurd, the postelection political process was not without struggle among competing parties and interests.
The United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdistan Alliance aligned shortly after the elections. It
took two months, however, for the different factions within the UIA to agree to a
government and then another month for them to gain parliamentary approval. During this
time the Constituent Assembly elected Jalal Talabani as president, promoting him to a
position in the Iraq government never before filled by a Kurd.182 Da’wa leader Ibrahim
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al-Jafari was elected Prime Minister, and Adel Abd al-Mahdi of SCIRI became second
deputy president.183 Despite continued infighting, the Shia and Kurds political groups
were in a position to greatly affect the content of the new constitution.
The Sunnis realized soon after the April 2005 formation of the transitional
government that their decision to boycott the elections prevented any chance of lobbying
for their interests during the constitution-writing process and thus threatened their
position in the new democracy. Consequently, they demanded to be included in the
constitution-drafting committee. With the help of the Americans, who realized Sunni
participation was vital to the security and stability of the government, the 55-member
drafting committee added 15 voting and 10 nonvoting Sunni delegates.184 Though this
movement was far from Sunni acceptance of the American-led and Shia-dominated
democratic process, it indicated that there was some recognition on the part of Sunni
leaders that the rules-based system offered potential rewards for participation.
Constitutional deliberations soon took center stage. Despite their inclusion, the
Sunnis remained apprehensive of what they saw as an overtly federal document. In their
view, such a constitution might lead to the formation of a Kurdish northern region and
Shia southern region, both with the majority of Iraq’s natural resources.185 While the Shia
and Kurds were satisfied with the institutionalization of a weak and thus less threatening
central government, “most Sunni Arab political leaders condemned the document,
contending that its provisions for a federal system with strong provincial and regional
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governments would lead to Iraq’s disintegration.”186 The issue of federalism also led to
conflict among Shia parties, as each sought to gain control over what they saw as the
inevitable formation of an independent and oil-rich Shia region.187
While maintaining the largely federal nature of the constitution, the Shia and
Kurdish members reluctantly agreed to the addition of an article that called for a new
debate over constitutional amendments after the general elections. This fulfilled a major
demand of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni bloc, and as a result it requested its
followers vote for constitutional approval. Even so, the constitution faced stiff Sunni
opposition, with three Sunni provinces casting negative votes. One of these Sunni
provinces registered 55 percent negative votes rather than the two-thirds required,
however, and the approval of Shia and Kurdish provinces ensured the constitution was
approved.188
The Transitional National Assembly decided to adopt a two-tiered proportional
representation system, one similar to that recommended by Iraqi and international
advisors, for the December 2005 National Assembly election. 230 of 275 seats were
allocated to the provinces as multimember districts, and the remaining 45 were filled
from national lists, a system that ensured proportionality.189 This procedure, along with
the decision by the Sunni leadership to participate, ensured that the community would be
represented in the National Assembly. Around 7,500 candidates participated in the
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elections, organized into coalitions of political parties, separate political parties, and
individuals.190
12 million Iraqis, or 77 percent of the voting population, took part in the
December elections.191 Five coalitions dominated the contests and were rewarded with
the majority of seats in the Assembly. These coalitions were the UIA, including a group
of al-Sadr’s followers, the Kurdistan Alliance, the Iraqi National List, and two Sunni
alliances, the Iraqi Accord Front and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.192 Though the
legislature was sufficiently representative of the major sectarian and ethnic groupings
within Iraq, the absence of parties that cut across identity lines or emphasized the larger
Iraqi national identity indicated a continuance of the politics first evident in the creation
of the IGC. The election confirmed ethnonational identity as the major determinant of
political identity, and made it difficult for secular parties based on Iraqi unity to compete.
The victory of political parties organized largely on the basis of identity was
unchallenged even with the change in electoral system. As Adeed Dawisha and Diamond
write, “…when the underlying pressures and constraints are powerful and entrenched, a
change in the electoral system may in the near term do little to transcend them.”193 Most
parties in place for the 2005 elections had come to recognize that appeals to ethnicity and
religious sect were both expected and instrumental for mobilizing support. Dawisha and
Diamond continue:
In their entrenchment of ethnic and sectarian fissures as the main organizing
principle of politics, the three votes highlighted the role and limits of electoral190
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system design in the quest to manage and contain potentially polarizing
divisions.194
Political competition among Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds was of course to some extent a
product of the communal tensions already evident at Iraq’s creation and intensified under
Saddam. The transition and early democratic institutions, however, had done little to this
point to ameliorate such sectarian conflict.
The elections and formation of the National Assembly were not accompanied by
any resolution of conflict. Violence increased greatly over this period, and by late 2006,
the UN reported that nearly 3,000 people were killed every month in sectarian clashes.195
From March 2006 to March 2007, civilian deaths numbered 26,540 by conservative
estimates, making it the most violent twelve month period since 2003.196 While the
violence in 2004 was largely on the part of Sunni insurgents wishing to force out the
United States and in protest of their loss of power, the increase in conflict in 2006 was
due to the rise of Shia militias in defense of the continued Sunni threats.197
The violence was arguably attributable to more than simple sectarian divisions
and jealousies. Penny Green and Tony Ward, for example, argue that the removal of
Saddam and his repressive and authoritarian state apparatus provided increased
opportunity for criminals to act. While much violence was politically motivated, it is just
as likely that some acts labeled political or sectarian were actually on the part of Iraqis
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criminals seeking to take advantage of a less secure situation.198 Paul R. Williams and
Tony Ward similarly argue that the absence of institutionalized security forces and
inability of the national government to control the situation led to increased divisions in
Iraqi society, “as Iraqis starving for protection turn[ed] to the only organizations that
appear to offer it: groups organized along ethno-sectarian lines.”199 The formation of
politics according to ethnic and sectarian identity was furthered by a security situation
that encouraged adherence to one’s most closely related groups.
Though important developments had taken place, including democratic elections
as touted by the Bush administration and other international observers, the increased
violence threatened political gains and made the few compromises accomplished between
sectarian groups tenuous. President Bush reasoned that increased security in Baghdad, the
center of the violence, was necessary for continued democratic progress. Consequently,
he ordered more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq in 2007, a decision
known as “the surge.” Military officials advised that increased troop levels would allow
American and Iraqi forces to secure gains made in neighborhoods once insurgents had
been removed.200 Decreased violence, it was supposed, would assist in improvements in
governance and the economy.
The surge was successful in reducing violence and improving security as higher
troop levels were able to establish and maintain control over larger areas. As Gause
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argues, however, “Equally important to the improved security situation was the revolt
among many Sunni Arabs against the excesses of al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Islamic State of
Iraq.”201 Additionally, the U.S. decided during this time to increase support of Sunni
groups opposed to al-Qaeda. These “Awakening Councils,” composed of Sunni tribal
elements, engaged in parliamentary campaigns against al-Qaeda and were funded by the
US. It could also be argued that once diverse neighborhoods had effectively been
homogenized through a process of ethnic and sectarian cleansing, limiting potential
sources of conflict.202
Regardless of its causes, the decrease in violence allowed important political
progress as pointed to by Williams and Simpson. In February 2008, the Assembly was
able to compromise across party lines to pass the Provincial Powers Law, Amnesty Law,
and 2008 Budget, all of which reflected different and at times competing interests. While
the Kurds emphasized the budget and its provisions for revenue distribution, the Sunnis
advocated amnesty and the Shia provincial powers. The fact that the legislature was able
pass all three was, in the view of Williams and Simpson, an important step forward in the
democratic process.203 Another settlement was reached on September 24, 2008, when the
Assembly ruled that provincial elections in Kirkuk would be held at a later date and
under a different set of rules. Though these deliberations delayed the provincial elections
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originally scheduled for October 1, 2008, the decision was a compromise between
Kurdish and Arab political interests.204
Provincial elections were held on January 31, 2009, and voters filled 440 seats in
14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Unlike elections in 2005, the 2009 elections implemented an
open list proportional representation system. This required Iraqis to vote for both a party
and individuals within the party. Provincial councils were organized according to the
percentage of votes gained by each party, with positions within the councils awarded to
individuals according to their electoral performances.205 Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law
coalition increased its standing in the government, winning approximately 20 percent of
the vote in southern provinces. Most of the other votes were spread across smaller parties,
and ISCI lost much of the power it had in previous governments.206 Interestingly, 80
percent of the political parties that competed for seats had formed after the 2005
elections, showing both wider participation and divisions within the major parties.207
Iraqi democracy was at a crossroads in the lead up to the 2010 National Assembly
elections. It had succeeded in creating a constitution that institutionalized representative
processes and adherence to the rule of law, and multiple votes with high turnouts and
legitimate results had established a functioning legislature, prime minister and president,
and provincial councils. Additionally, increased troop levels and a greater focus on
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counterinsurgency allowed important security improvements and gave the new
institutions room to operate and make important future decisions.
Serious challenges remained, however. The political system was based largely on
ethnic and sectarian divisions, and there was no guarantee that conflict among
communities would subside as competition for political power and control over resources
intensified. Though these difficulties are in many ways characteristic of a democratic
transition in a divided state, Iraq faced the additional problem of democracy imposed
externally. As Diamond writes:
…the coalition never realized that, although most Iraqis were deeply grateful to
have been liberated from a brutal tyranny, this gratitude was mixed with deep
suspicion of the real motives of the United States […]; humiliation that it was not
Iraqis themselves who had overthrown Saddam; and high, indeed unrealistic,
expectations for the post-war administration, which they assumed could deliver
them rapidly from all their problems.208
Mistakes made by the United States and the challenge of authenticity for a system created
largely by outsiders negatively affected an already difficult transition.
The question of legitimacy was a major one going forward, both in the continued
involvement of the United States and the major political and economic questions
requiring compromise among competing interests and identities. There were indications,
however, that Iraq’s major political actors had reluctantly agreed to participate in
democracy, if only to secure goods for their own communities. None of Iraq’s ethnic or
sectarian groups was attempting to break away from the state or to gain autonomy beyond
the federalism offered by the constitution. Rather, conflict was mostly over control of the
state in a political system that allowed for new competition and power relationships.
208

Diamond, “What Went Wrong,” 182.

82

Continued ethno-sectarian conflict was not inevitable, but debate over the future role of
the United States and the upcoming political contests were likely to test the new
government and its status for the Iraqi people.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE KURDISH ISSUE
The status of the Kurds of Iraq is an additional problem facing this country. The
future of democracy in Iraq is tied to a resolution of this issue. Their sense of security and
continued participation within the democratic system will further legitimize the Iraqi
state, especially given their historic status as a nation spread among multiple countries
with aspirations of independence. Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson summarize the
importance of the current relationship between the central government and the Kurdish
region:
Put simply, if the management of this division is successful and results in a
durable set of political compromises, then Iraq will survive and may even evolve
into a sustainable democracy. If, however, the divide worsens, or if there is an
attempt by Baghdad to impose a ‘solution’ on Erbil – which would then be
followed by a violent reaction – then the fragile political consensus that underpins
Iraq’s nascent political order will unravel in short order, and the very territorial
integrity of Iraq will be threatened.209
A failure to incorporate the Kurds in the Iraqi democratic system threatens the legitimacy
of the government and endangers Kurdistan’s existence in Iraq, a scenario that would
likely lead to tensions across the region.
As referenced in the previous chapter, the modern Iraqi government played a
major role in shaping identity and thus political and social relationships. This naturally
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affected the Kurds, particularly in their position as an ethnic minority in a state that rarely
encouraged unifying and civic conceptions of belonging. According to Denise Natali:
it was the drive of the Iraqi elites to construct an ethnicized, secular-based
nationalism within a highly centralized political system that ultimately prevented
ethnic reshaping in Iraq. While opportunities for reshaping existed, the state elites
failed to instill a normative sense of ‘Iraqiness’ among Kurdish communities.210
The ramifications of this history are evident today in the Kurds’ status as an autonomous
community that in many aspects wishes to remain distinct from the rest of the Iraqi state.
Despite this legacy, it is possible to argue that for now the Kurds have accepted
their place within Iraq and and are not acting to create an independent state. This view is
bolstered by the unlikelihood that other states with Kurdish populations or the
international community at large would support the creation of an independent territory
based on Kurdish nationalism. According to Michael M. Gunter, Kurds in Iraq adopted
the slogan “Democracy for Iraq, autonomy for Kurdistan,”211 during the 20th century in
response to this realization. Still, the place of the Kurds within the newly democratic Iraq
remains an important question and one that will affect the stability of the state and the
functioning of its political system for years to come.
The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, although the community also
comprises a number of Shia, Christian, and other sects. They share a common history,
language, and culture, and have historically considered Kurdistan their homeland. Such
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facts have led to “their being both self- and other-defined as a nation.”212 As an ideology,
Kurdish nationalism developed in the mid to late 19th century under the influence of
rising Arab and Turkish nationalism among each respective community’s intellectuals.
According to Hashem Ahmadzadeh, it is unlikely the term “Kurd” was used by members
of the group before this period; “rather, it seems likely that it was an ‘outsider’s term’
used by Arabs and Persians, with indigenous names being of tribal or geographic
origin.”213
Despite the spread of nationalist ideas, Kurds were unable to attain their goal of
an independent homeland after the end of the Ottoman Empire. In the new nation-state
system that emerged after World War I, the Kurdish population was spread over multiple
states. Ahmadzadeh argues that this failure can largely be attributed to the fact that
“Kurdistan and the Kurds were divided by European imperial actions, and then targeted
by the dominant nations in the countries they eventually found themselves in.”214 The
Kurds’ division among five states, including Iraq, “burdened the Kurds with a structural
weakness when it came to promoting an ethnic (i.e. pan-) Kurdistani agenda.”215 As a
consequence, the Kurds have sought integration and protection within the states they
reside while retaining the identity that bonds their community across state boundaries.
Today Iraqi Kurds number 3.4 million and form 20 to 23% of the population.
They live primarily in northern Iraq, bordered by Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, and
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Syria to the west. Politically, the Kurds are largely divided into two factions: the Kurdish
Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani, whose father founded the party in 1946, and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, created in 1975 under Jalal Talabani. According to
Gunter, “Divided by philosophy, dialect, geography, and ultimately ambition, Barzani’s
KDP and Talabani’s PUK have alternated between cooperation and bloody conflict.”216
Despite many shared goals, the two groups have often disagreed, a reality that is
becoming more evident as they gain and compete for power in the Iraqi democracy.
The history of the Iraqi Kurds is characterized by the government’s halfhearted
attempts at integration and a struggle by the center to control the Kurdish periphery.
Under British management, the provisional constitution of 1921 attempted to formalize
equality of all Iraq’s constituent groups. This was accomplished through statements
acknowledging Arab and Kurdish ethnicity within the Iraqi state and equality between the
Kurdish and Arabic languages. In reality, however, the British generally favored
landowning Arabs, and “the large cultural and political opportunities promised to Kurds
were limited in time and unevenly implemented, which heightened the ethnic and socioeconomic dichotomies in Iraqi and Kurdish society.”217 Some Kurdish landowners
benefited, but the peasant majority was largely ignored.
Throughout the 1920s, the Kurds struggled against the prospect of being
controlled by an Arab government. As Denise Natali writes, “Kurds not only lost their
own bid for statehood, but were placed in a new context where their former Muslim
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counterparts were now their overlords.”218 The British responded to such sentiments by
attempting to satisfy the most powerful Kurdish groups, particularly the tribal and
landowning classes. This complemented their strategy of ensuring cooperation with
Iraq’s other groups, and resulted in pledges of allegiance to the government among some
Kurds.219 The majority, however, remained uninvolved with the state-building project
and were dissatisfied with their diminished role relative to Iraq’s Arabs.
In the lead up to Iraqi independence, the Kurds became increasingly wary of
growing Arab nationalism and Great Britain’s response to it. For example, the AngloIraqi Treaty of 1930 signed by Great Britain and the mandate government in Iraq did not
acknowledge the Kurds or the rights of Iraq’s minorities. There was a growing gap
between the educational and economic opportunities of Arabs and Kurds, and
governmental power was increasingly tilted in the Arab’s favor. As Natali notes, from
1920 to 1936 only four out of 57 cabinet ministers were Kurds.220 Consequently, the
Kurds had little say in the state’s future and their place in it, leading them to depend on
their own communal leaders and institutions for stability and support.
Iraq became an independent state in 1932 and was accepted into the League of
Nations with the requirement that it accept “international obligations to protect the civil
and political rights of the Kurds and their rights as a minority group.”221 This
pronouncement as well as subsequent legislation involving language rights and other
provisions lead some to argue that “in strictly legal terms, Kurds have enjoyed more
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national rights in Iraq than in any other host country.”222 Similarly, according to Reidar
Visser, “Iraq was the first state with a significant Kurdish population to address the
Kurdish issue in a comparatively non-paranoid fashion.”223 From Iraq’s creation, then,
there was at the least an acknowledgement by the British and Iraqi elite that the Kurds
formed an important part of the new state and that their demands required attention.
The reality of the Kurds’ integration into Iraq is questionable, however, as the
government did not accompany proclamations of equality and inclusivity with concrete
steps toward these goals. For example, following independence, King Faisal did not
uphold the protections promised by Great Britain, and “key legislation…was
implemented half-heartedly or not at all.”224 Carole A. O’Leary goes so far as to assert,
“Since the creation of the modern state of Iraq, the history of Iraqi Kurdistan has been
one of underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleansing,
and genocide.”225 As the central state gained power, it became obvious to many Kurds
that to gain influence or a measure of autonomy for their community required a
commitment to the vision of Baghdad and thus of the Sunni Arab elites who dominated
the state.
Subsequent regimes showed some promise of better relations between the center
and the Kurds. Under Bakr Sidqi, from 1936 to 1937, there was greater recognition of
both the Kurds and Shia and their contribution to the Iraqi heritage. Abd al-Karim
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Qassem, prime minister from 1958 to 1963, continued this trend and included both
groups in his government, establishing a provisional constitution that professed Iraq’s
Arab and Kurd nations. As a result, “major political dividing lines were reorganized on
ideological principles transcending communal boundaries.”226 Kurds enjoyed greater
educational opportunities, government participation, and cultural recognition during this
time.
The rise of Arab nationalism proved a powerful force, one that Iraq’s leaders
could not ignore and negatively affected their dealings with the Kurdish community. As
Natali writes, “Under Arab nationalist influences Kurdish-state relations spiralled
downward.”227 Qassem, for example, divided Kurdish organizations, including the KDP,
and arrested leading Kurdish nationalists. The Kurds lost much of their political power as
a result of the growth of pan-Arabism. During the monarchy, Kurds formed 15% of the
higher ranks of the administration and 25% of the lower ranks. By the 1960s, the rise of
Arab nationalism, Kurds held only 2% of the positions in the higher tiers and 13% in the
lower.228 Sunni Arabs became dominant in the army and government positions while both
Kurds and Shia were increasingly marginalized.
The 1958 revolution was met with new hopes for Kurdish integration and genuine
cooperation between the Kurds and Arabs. Kurdish leaders, including Barzani, were
freed, and Khalid Naqshabandi, a Kurd, was included in the three-man sovereignty
council. The rise of the Baath Party led to hopes of an accommodating central
government that would allow for some measure of Kurdish autonomy. Both hopes proved
226
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futile. After the revolution, the Arab nationalist Free Officers strengthened their hold over
the Kurds. Later, talks with the Baath government on possible autonomy went sour over
the Kurdish desire to include Kirkuk and Mosul. The Baathists militarized their
oppression of the Kurds and began a process of Arabization by which they denied a
distinct Kurdish identity and encouraged Arabs to move to the north of the country.229
Saddam’s rise to power allowed some openings for Kurds and Shias who were
especially loyal to the Baathist regime. During the early Baath years, the government
offered the Kurds an agreement known as the March Manifesto in an attempt to
“consolidate [its]…grip on civil, political, and military power within the nation.”230 In the
Manifesto’s final form, negotiated between Saddam Hussein and Mahmud Uthman on
behalf of the KDP in 1970, many of the Kurds’ demands were met. It guaranteed Kurdish
participation in the government as well as senior positions, ensured that one of Iraq’s vice
presidents would be Kurdish and that all officials in Kurdistan would be Kurd or speak
Kurdish, and designated funds to develop Kurdistan.231
In 1974, Saddam Hussein offered the Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan
to Barzani in another attempt at cooperation between the two groups. This law
established Kurdistan as self-governing, but did not include Kirkuk and “imposed a
vastly more central government control over the region than was envisaged by the March
Manifesto.”232 Barzani did not accept the offer, and neither this law nor the Manifesto
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came to fruition. For the Kurds, this was yet another example of the central state’s
unfulfilled promises and lack of understanding of Kurdish aims.
Natali summarizes the relationship between the Iraqi central government and
Kurds throughout this period:
By 1970 the pattern of reshaping behavior had become clear. After regime
changes or when government power is threatened, the state elites attempt to
reshape to consolidate their power-base. But given the domination of conservative
Arab nationalist, and military factions in the government, the elites are unable or
unwilling to cross the threshold of granting the Kurds political equality.
Reshaping is not real but simply a time-gaining tactic used by Iraqi officials.233
The regime cooperated with and gave concessions to the Kurds when politically
expedient, but easily dismissed Kurdish demands when it did not need their support. It is
interesting to speculate whether this pattern continues to affect the Kurds’ perception of
their role in the government today and if their fear of being taken advantage of by the
central state leads them to be more emphatic in their demands.
The central government was able to increase its control over all of Iraq’s
communities by taking advantage of Iraq’s increasing oil wealth. According to Natali,
“The petrol economy created new incentive structures for the state elites to co-opt and
control Kurdish groups.”234 This included increasing the Arab populations of Kirkuk and
other regions with significant oil reserves. The Baath party also tightened its grip on the
state to the extent that Iraqi citizenship required loyalty to and membership in its ranks.235
This was exemplified by a law in 1986 in which anyone who ran for election to the
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Legislative Council, an elected body within Kurdistan, had to be approved by the central
government and believe in and promote the principles of the party.236
The beginning of the Iran-Iraq war was characterized by a slight improvement in
Kurdish-Arab relations, largely because the government wished to temper any domestic
issues that would hurt their efforts in combat. As the war reached its conclusions,
however, “the diminishing military threat from Iran freed the government to concentrate
additional forces against the Kurds.”237 This was in response to Kurdish nationalists’
support of Iran and their increased control over northern regions as the central
government was concentrated on its military efforts. The result was increased torture,
relocation, and indiscriminate detention imposed on the Kurds by the central government.
Arguably the worst devastation experienced by Iraq’s Kurds took place in 1988
and is known as Al-Anfal. During this campaign, Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam’s cousin,
undertook mass executions in Kurdish villages, destroying 90% of them and at least 20
small towns. Writes O’Leary, “The operation was carefully planned and included
identifying villages in rebel held areas, declaring these villages and surrounding areas
‘prohibited’ and authorizing the killing of any person or animal found in these areas.”238
Human Rights Watch concluded the event was a crime of genocide and made special note
of the regime’s use of chemical weapons against the town of Halabja and other Kurdish
villages.239 The extreme degree of violence has been a stain on Kurdish-Arab relations
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since, and confirms for many Kurds their perception of a history of persecution and
violence suffered under the Iraqi state.
In defense, Saddam argued Al-Anfal was part of an operation against traitors of
the state and the Kurds’ desire to gain autonomy. The attack was also intended as revenge
for the Kurds’ support, whether real or perceived, of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.240 In
1986, the Iranian government brokered a truce between the PUK and KDP, leading
Saddam to fear an alliance between Kurdistan and Iran.241 Given the scale of death and
destruction during the eight year war, it was not difficult for Saddam to convince many
Iraqis that his actions were necessary to secure the country from further incursions.
Saddam’s rhetoric also gave weight to the view that the Kurds were outsiders and not full
and authentic members of the Iraqi state.
The Kurds became involved in the revolt against the Iraqi government in the
spring of 1991. Many of those who participated believed the U.S. under President George
Bush was going to support the uprising, and were greatly disappointed when he did not
supply them with arms. This belief originated with Bush’s suggestion that the Iraqi
people “take matters into their own hands” and force Saddam out of power. Similar
statements were broadcast to the Iraqis on the Voice of American station. Regardless of
the catalyst, Saddam put down the uprising easily and used ground troops and helicopter
gunships to regain the north. At least 20,000 Kurds died in the crackdown, and millions
of refugees fled to Turkey and Iran.242
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In response, the United Nations Security Council created a Kurdish safe haven
and northern no-fly zone through Resolution 688. This region was 40,000 square
kilometers in area, about half the size of Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq withdrew its government
from the safe haven in October 1991, allowing the Kurds there a measure of selfgovernance under the new Kurdistan Regional Government. Elections to the Kurdistan
National Assembly took place in May 1992, resulting in a power sharing agreement
between the KDP and PUK.243 The Kurds within the area consequently gained experience
in the processes of democracy and participation in a representative government, a
familiarity that many observers have argued affects their involvement in Iraqi democracy
today.
The failure of the uprising and subsequent creation of the safe haven by the U.N.
were major developments in the Kurds’ relationship with the central government. In
many ways, the uprising was a continuance of the struggle by Iraqi Kurds to make their
demands known to the increasingly powerful central state. Saddam’s violent reaction then
cemented the Kurdish perception of their inferior status within Iraq. The creation of an
autonomous region for the Kurds was in many ways necessary given the brutality they
experienced at the regime’s hands, but it furthered the Kurd’s experience of being
separate from the Arabs and thus separate from the state. Maintenance of this level of
self-rule has become a nonnegotiable for Kurds in democratic Iraq, a stipulation that
some believe threatens the state’s unity.
As a fairly autonomous area under the protection of the United Nations, the
Kurdish haven was able to avoid many of the effects of sanctions that were so detrimental
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to the rest of the country. The opportunities provided by this shield did not influence all
residents of the area equally, however. Thabit Abdullah writes:
The relative safety created the basis for a more stable economy, but its uncertain
future, fear of Turkish intentions, and the continuous rivalry between the KDP
and PUK also gave rise to smuggling and profiteering, with the two Kurdish
parties making the most of this parallel economy.244
Kurdish autonomy was not without its challenges, and failed to satisfy many of the
expectations of the population. Still, it was an important development, and one that has
greatly affected their place in Iraqi democracy.
Two years after the creation of the KRG the arrangement between KDP and PUK
broke down and was accompanied by serious clashes between the parties. According to
Gunter:
Ultimately, their conflict derived from the old struggle for power between the
more conservative, nationalist KDP, associated with the Kurmanji or Bahdinani
speaking areas in the mountainous northwest of northern Iraq, and the most leftist,
socialist PUK, largely based in the Sorani speaking areas of Sulaymaniya in the
southeast.245
They also conflicted over each other’s relations with Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. While the
U.S. helped to broker a peace deal and division of power in 1998, the PUK and KDP
remain somewhat antagonist actors as they continue to compete for power.
Despite the violence of the 1980s and 1991, the Kurds were arguably still
committed to their existence in Iraq. It is true more Kurds during this time demanded
federalism as a way to gain power beyond that offered by autonomy, yet “it cannot be
emphasized enough that Kurdish demands at this point did not envisage the obliteration
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of Baghdad as a center of government.”246 As Gunter writes, “Despite the abject failure
of Iraqi nationalism to satisfy and encompass Kurdish nationalism,” both parties
remained loyal to Iraq. Barzani declared “our [the Kurdish] goal is not to set up an
independent state,” while Talibani stated, “We do not want to break away from Iraq; we
want a democratic Iraq.”247 Thus, Iraqi Kurds focused on their status within the state
rather than a wider, shared identity with their Kurdish brethren in other countries.
The condition of the Kurds in Iraq prior to the American invasion, then, was one
of separation and resentment. In 2002 and 2003, the Kurds and other opposition groups
within Iraq felt increasingly certain that the Bush administration was preparing to
overthrow Saddam Hussein. Seeking to gain power and decision-making capabilities in
the aftermath, the groups met in February 2003 in the Kurdish safe haven to form a
preparatory committee for the post-Saddam transition.248 Unsurprisingly, the Kurds were
supportive of the U.S. campaign and played a central role from the beginning of the
democratic project. As the Coalition Provisional Authority and other early decisionmaking bodies included limited Sunni participation, the Kurds and Shia were empowered
and allowed to voice their interests to an extent they had never experienced before.
Going forward in the transition, the political alliance between the Kurdish bloc
and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq was instrumental in the passage of the
constitution by referendum in January 2005 and the composition of the Council of
Representatives. The Iraqi Governing Council included Barzani and Talabani as well as
three other, independent Kurdish leaders, and a top Barzani aide, Hoshyar Zebari, was
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foreign minister in the cabinet appointed by the IGC. The interim government was
similarly organized, with Zabari acting as foreign minister and Talabani aide Barham
Salih as deputy Prime Minister. In addition to their political participation, the 75,000
strong peshmerga Kurdish militia was “the most pro-U.S. force in Iraq” during this time
and thus played an important role in the growing security services.249
According to Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, “The high level Kurdish
participation marked the first time in Iraq’s history that the Kurds had entered national
politics on an equal footing with Iraq’s Arab majority.”250 This development naturally
legitimized democracy in Kurdish eyes, despite the uncertainty over the shape of the
government and the level of participation by Iraq’s other groups. The Kurds’ major
demands following Saddam’s removal were:
…autonomy bordering on outright independence, the expansion of their
autonomous region to include Kirkuk and parts of the province of Mosul, and a
weak central government in Baghdad to ensure that their gains will not be
overturned.251
They took full advantage of their ascendant position under a U.S. fostered democratic
process to ensure that these demands were heard and met as fully as possible.
The Kurds’ bargaining position was compounded by the Sunni boycott. Their
willingness and ability to participate in the new government and thus to influence policy
in the early stages allowed them to include what is known as the “Kurdish veto” in the
constitution. This affirms that constitutional revisions may be rejected by a two-thirds
majority vote in three or more provinces, ensuring that the Kurdish regions can halt

249

Katzman and Prados, “The Kurds,” 34-35.
Katzman and Prados, “The Kurds,” 4.
251
Abdullah, A Short History, 168.
250

98

amendments they see as harmful to their interests. The constitution is also inherently
federal in that it creates distinct regions with allocated governmental powers, a provision
that can protect the Kurds from excesses or abuses on the part of the central
government.252
Iraq’s Shia and Sunni communities were understandably anxious over the
prospect of increased Kurdish autonomy embodied in a new constitution. In response, the
Kurds argued “that the Kurdish preference for federalism was driven by security needs
more than a desire to break away, and that federalism was the strongest guarantee that the
country would remain united.”253 Though the inclusion of such provisions was necessary
to gain Kurdish support, there is disagreement over whether the Kurd’s success in the
constitution-building process has led to hesitation over its rightfulness among Iraq’s other
constituencies.
Consequently, some argue that the Kurds’ input to the constitution led to the
creation of a document:
…that reflects the political realities of the immediate post-invasion period, when
those opposed to the furthering of Kurdish autonomy or the federalization of Iraq
– namely Sunnis and Shias not affiliated with ISCI – were excluded (or, more
precisely, excluded themselves) from the constitution-writing process.254
Democratic legitimacy requires buy-in by all the major state actors towards the
constitution and the government structure it puts forward. If Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias feel
the current document does not sufficiently protect their interests, conflict over any
proposed changes will likely manifest.
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The debate over Kirkuk is exemplary of the larger tensions between the Kurds
and the central Iraqi government. Kurds consider the region part of Kurdistan, albeit one
that was “Turkified during the Ottoman Empire and Arabized by every government since
the inception of the state.”255 Today, Kirkuk’s population includes Kurds as well as
Arabs, Turkmens, and Christians. Kirkuk is located next to Iraq’s second largest oil field,
which holds one-fifth of the country’s reserves, increasing its strategic value.256 The
region is of great economic and symbolic significance to both Erbil and Baghdad as they
attempt to come to an agreement on the shape of Kurdish federalism.
In line with Kurdish demands, the Transitional Administrative Law of 2004
stipulated three stages in the determination of Kirkuk’s status in the newly democratic
Iraq. These included normalization, or a reversal of Arabization, a census, and a
referendum. The constitution’s Article 140 incorporated this outline, and were it to be
implemented, it is likely the referendum would lead to Kirkuk’s inclusion in Kurdistan.
The support of Kirkuk’s other minorities for this policy is questionable, however, and the
geographic segmentation of its Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen communities further
complicates any other initiative of the Kurdish leadership.257
Furthermore, Turkey is firmly opposed to Article 140 or other attempts to include
Kirkuk in Kurdistan, as its leaders believe such a determination would empower Iraqi
Kurds to the point of declaring their independence.258 This would likely incite Turkey’s
own restive Kurdish population. Regional tensions are already high given the
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assertiveness of Iraqi Kurds and their strengthened position in the state. Turkey, Iran, and
Syria view the possibility of more boldness by the Kurds of Iraq as threatening to the
stability of their own Kurdish regions in its potential spillover effects.
The debate over federalism and the Kurds’ rightful place in Iraq has been shifted
by a change in the demographics of Kurdistan. Many Arabs living within the boundaries
of Kurdistan were relocated there as part of the Saddam’s forced Arabization campaign,
leading many Kurds to perceive them as outsiders. This transference has accelerated
since 2003, as nearly 20,000 Arabs have moved north to seek jobs in Kurdistan’s stronger
economy.259 It is more difficult to argue for autonomy on the basis of Kurdish identity
and guarantees of cultural and language rights when the ethnic makeup of the region is
increasingly mixed. This affects subsequent Kurdish demands, because Kurdistan’s
leaders must attempt to pacify both the Kurdish and non-Kurdish populations.
The reality of the KDP and PUK’s participation in the Iraqi government has led
them to expand their bases of support by tailoring their platforms to include the nonKurdish populations in Kurdistan. Neither Talabani nor Barzani will risk his position in
the government by raising the issue of secession, and any talk of Kurdish-nationalism is
avoided in the interests of relations with Turkey and other neighboring states. This stance
may become problematic for the current Iraqi Kurdish leaders, for:
…it is exactly these sorts of ideas that the active political classes in Iraqi
Kurdistan now wish to hear, and this is one of the main reasons (along with the
issue of corruption) why the leadership of the KDP and PUK is routinely and
powerfully criticized.260

259
260

Barkey and Laipson, “Iraqi Kurds,” 68.
Ahmadzadeh, “Kurdish or Kurdistanis,” 147.

101

Participation in a democracy requires Kurdish leaders to seek to meet the demands of all
those living in Kurdistan, but may endanger their support among a Kurdish population
who sees them as too yielding in their platforms.
Most recently is the controversy posed by current Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki.
Maliki is often described as a centrist, and has been publicly critical of federalism in Iraq
since 2005. He was also supported by the Sadrists in 2006, a group that has been
particularly vocal in their opposition to the Kurdish demand for Kirkuk. According to
Visser, Maliki stated in November 2007 that “decentralization should not come at the
expense of the governance capabilities of the capital.”261 Whether Maliki’s concern over
federalism is related to its potential effects on state stability or his own efforts to amass
power at the center is uncertain. His position in Iraqi politics, however, ensures his views
will be taken seriously by Kurds and non-Kurds.
The question of federalism has also led Maliki and the leaders of Kurdistan to
spar over foreign oil investments. Kurdistan, under the KRG, has signed almost 50 oil
and gas deals with international oil companies. However, the central government has
claimed that it considers any such deals with the KRG as invalid, though the KRG asserts
that they are acting within the constitution. Most recently, a member of the Iraqi
Department for Energy stated that Exxon Mobil would be excluded from the state’s
upcoming licensing auction because it had struck a deal with the KRG. Much of this
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conflict might stem from a claim by both the KRG and the central government for oilrich territory that was included in the KRG-Exxon deal.262
Given these tensions, some Iraqis argue that it may be time to reassess the
constitution and its emphasis on regionalism and devolution. In their view, such a
discussion will “return Iraq to what is perceived to be its ‘natural’ state, a unitary entity
focused on Baghdad with key competences all under the control of a centralized state.”263
Though many Shia supported federalism during 2005 as a guard against the rise of a
powerful Saddam-like leader, their current position in the state has changed their
calculations. Conversely, Sunni leaders have historically favored a centralized state but
now worry about the national government’s increasing authority under Maliki.264
Kurds also support the efforts of other provinces, such as Sunni-majority Diyala
and Anbar, to gain autonomy. Maliki is staunchly opposed to this stance, as he sees such
autonomy as a threat to the authority of the central government.265 It is difficult to assess
how popular the Kurdish vision of increased autonomy for Iraq’s constituent groups is
among other members of the population. According to Visser, since 2008 most of Iraq,
besides Kurdistan, has been mostly satisfied with the federal government as operating
from Baghdad.266 Similarly, as reported by The National Interest:
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For Kurds, federalism has almost acquired the status of a religious belief system
because it is tied to their century-old quest for their own state. But for many Iraqi
Arabs, federalism is seen as synonymous with partition.267
It is true many Iraqis want decentralization to the extent of greater authority over issues
of local interest. Most, however, do not support Kurdistan-level autonomy.
The departure of American forces in late 2011 has of course forced new
calculations for the Kurds, believed by many to be America’s strongest ally in the
country. The new situation has worried the Kurds, for “among Iraqis, the Kurds benefited
the most from the war, and now may have the most to lose if the political
chaos…metastasizes into civil war.”268 In an interview with The New York Times,
Barham A. Salih, prime minister of the Kurdish regional government admitted the
community’s fear, saying, “Our national interest as Kurds lies in a democratic, federal,
peaceful Iraq. We still have a long way to go before we get there.”269 Going forward, the
Kurds are positioned between Sunni and Shia factions that are, for the moment,
increasingly hostile toward each other. The best-case scenario for democracy in Iraq
would be for the Kurdish political community to offer a bridge between the competing
Arabs, stimulating the compromises needed for democracy.
Perhaps it is not that Iraqi Kurds do not want their own state, but that for the
moment they see remaining part of Iraq with a measure of autonomy as their best option.
They of course factor into such calculations the likelihood that a move toward
independent statehood would aggravate Iran, Turkey, and Syria, possibly leading to
regional conflict. According to Abdullah:
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Ironically, Kurdish leaders who have long fought for autonomy and greater
separation are today doing more to keep the country unified than any of the Arab
leaders. There is a greater awareness in Kurdistan that the dismemberment of the
country will surely result in Turkish and Iranian intervention, leading to the loss
of even limited regional sovereignty.270
The uncertainty that accompanies a failing Iraqi state leads many Kurdish leaders to
support unity, to guarantee their own positions and the successes their community has
achieved.
More fundamental is the remaining problem of the Kurds’ and other groups’ sense
of belonging in the Iraqi state. According to Gunter:
For democracy and federalism to work, all groups must recognize the legitimacy
of the state, trust in one’s fellow citizens, and have faith in majority rule. Since
there is no tradition of any of this in Iraq, the Kurdish future in post-Saddam Iraq
remains problematic.271
This issue is especially contentious for the Kurds, given their community’s long tradition
as a minority making demands for independence. Henri J. Barkey and Ellen Laipson
argue: “Should federalism be viewed over time as weakening the Iraqi state and unity of
the country, the Kurds and their affective advocacy of their interests could well be held
accountable.”272 Iraq’s Kurds must balance their desire for autonomy and recognition
with participation and enrichment of the democratic process.
Iraqi Kurds’ desire for a weak national government that upholds their demands for
power sharing measures and a federal structure with significant autonomy is based on
their generally contentious history with the central state. There is a sense that Kurds will
press for increased self-rule or threaten secession if Iraq’s democracy fails to guarantee
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these demands or is seen as withholding too much power from provincial administrations.
The prospects of independence, however, are questionable: geopolitical realities preempt
Kurdish secessionism and potential benefits from Kurdistan’s oil wealth require major
improvements in the region’s infrastructure. Arguably, the best option for the Kurds is
that Iraqi democracy strengthens and so demands their continued participation and
support. Improved and better functioning rules and institutions will further provide for
the recognition of Kurdish demands while allowing cooperation between the Kurds and
other political factions on matters that rightfully concern the entire state.
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CHAPTER SIX: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION?
Iraq’s experience with democracy has been mixed so far, as historical ethnic and
social divisions have become salient and conflictual through the external introduction of a
more open and competitive political system. The challenges faced by Iraq during its
transition are in some ways characteristic of the general experience of countries with
multiple ethnic and religious groups. However, Iraq is unique in many ways as well,
given the unity displayed by its communities at various points in its history and the
potential for their cooperation under more favorable economic and political
circumstances. Iraq’s democratic experience is also influenced by the fact that the
transition was initiated by an outside power, one that has played a heavy role in
determining the shape of the system. The inability of the state to deal with competing
political demands in a context of decreased security led to intersectarian conflict that
continues to test the state today.
However, it is possible democratic government has gained a degree of legitimacy
among the Iraqi population and will offer a long-term solution to conflict management
among Iraq’s communities. Democracy provides equality under the law and allows the
articulation of all major interests. It addresses previously violent conflicts through
political channels, and gives communities an opportunity to make their demands known
through institutionalized methods of representation. Over time, it may promote a civic

107

identity that encompasses all ethnicities and religious sects. It is important then to explore
how this occurs and if Iraq displays any evidence of such a development.
Generally, democracies are more likely to endure when they experience a high
level of legitimacy, or support from citizens of the state. According to Leonardo Morlino
and Jose R. Montero, legitimacy “is a set of positive attitudes of a society toward its
democratic institutions, which are considered as the most appropriate for of
government.”273 New democracies may experience an initial increase in legitimacy
simply because they offer change from the authoritarian regimes of the past. However,
citizens may hold back their support for the new system because they are uncertain how it
will affect them. It is also likely that in the beginning stages the rules of democracy are
imperfect and incomplete, and thus unsuccessful in providing acceptable political
outcomes.
Legitimacy is separate from efficacy, or a political system’s effectiveness in
accomplishing policy objectives. While efficacy is affected by a regime’s economic
performance, legitimacy is tied more closely to citizens’ perceptions of the rightfulness of
democracy as compared to other political systems. As Morlino and Montero note:
…the correlations between preferences for democracy over authoritarianism
(diffuse legitimacy) on the one hand, and satisfaction with the working of the
respondent’s democratic regime (perceived efficacy), on the other, are rather
low.274
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Again, citizens may be attracted to democracy largely because it represents a break with
the authoritarian regimes of the past. Such perceptions are unlikely to last, however, and
democratic legitimacy consequently requires a basis in something besides its novelty.
Though Iraq has had continuous democratic government since 2005, successive
leaders and coalitions have largely failed to tackle the state’s most pressing problems.
Many challenges related to economic and social infrastructure may be blamed on
Saddam’s wars and the breakdown in state capacity following 2003, but the inability of
democracy to adequately tackle joblessness, inequality, and corruption has frustrated
most Iraqis. For example, unemployment is more than 15 percent, and 25 percent of the
population lives under the poverty line. 40 percent of Iraqis are age 14 and under,
resulting in a high influx of new laborers and further strains on the job market. The level
of urbanization has reached 66 percent, placing increased demands on the state’s already
burdened health and education facilities. Finally, Transparency International ranked Iraq
the seventh most corrupt country in the world in 2011 and noted its lack of transparency
and safeguards for investments.275
There are a number of signs the economy is slowly making progress, however. As
reported by The Daily News Egypt, gross domestic product growth reached 9.6 percent in
2011 after averaging 3.6 percent between 2004 and 2010. The International Monetary
Fund estimates that GDP growth will surpass 10 percent through 2016. Foreign
investment in particular has increased, with estimates that new contracts reached $55.7
billion in 2011 and involved 276 companies from 45 countries. Half of the new contracts
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in 2011 were in oil, gas, or residential real estate, with the rest in electricity, water, and
sanitation, “showing how the primitive state of Iraq’s infrastructure is a business
opportunity as well as an obstacle for investors.”276 Still, it will likely take years for most
Iraqis to benefit from the state’s recent economic growth. The hope of future economic
prosperity or overall efficacy is not sufficient to legitimize Iraq’s democracy.
It is possible the processes of democracy may themselves build legitimacy for the
system. Alfred C. Stepan argues that a government can retain legitimacy simply by
claiming that its authority is based on “democratic procedural origins” rather than success
in the economic or other realms.277 This contention is based on democracy’s status as a
system in which citizens can vote out representatives with whom they are dissatisfied and
so remain hopeful for the prospects of new leadership and policies. Furthermore, citizens
will consider democracy more legitimate over time if they perceive it to respect their
rights and give them reasonable expectations for the future. Stepan writes:
As long as a democratic regime completely respects the rule of law, this respect
can act as an independent insulating factor for the regime and one to which
citizens can attach an independent value.278
It is unlikely a new democracy will be completely successful in this regard, but if citizens
believe the system is making progress then it is possible it will retain support.
The most recent Iraqi elections took place on March 7, 2010 and filled the 325
seat Council of Representatives. Most noteworthy was the dispute between the State of
Law coalition and Iraqiyya over the rightful prime minister following the announcement
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of election results, delaying the formation of a government for nearly nine months. While
Iraqiyya, a self-described secular party supported by many Sunni, received more votes
than State of Law, a coalition of mostly-Shia parties headed by then prime minister Nuri
al-Maliki, the judiciary was pressured by Maliki to reassess the election rules established
in the constitution. The judiciary subsequently ruled in Maliki’s favor and allowed State
of Law the opportunity to align with another Shia bloc post-elections to gain sufficient
seats and form the government.279 This controversial move prompted protest by former
interim prime minister Iyad Allawi and other politicians, followed by a nine-month
stalemate during which State of Law and Iraqiyya leaders debated how the government
was to be formed and who was the rightful prime minister.
A power sharing arrangement known as the Arbil Agreement was formalized in
November 2010. The settlement called for the participation of all blocs in the formation
of a “national partnership government.”280 Major issues related to the formal inclusion of
Iraqiyya and minority parties remained unresolved, however, and according to Marina
Ottoway and Danial Anas Kaysi, the government “was from the outset based on a fragile
grand alliance of parties brought together not by a common ideology or a common
governing program, but by expediency.”281 Neither State of Law nor Iraqiyya were able
to gain the needed seats along without including the other, and ISCI and the Sadrists,
though not particularly supportive of Maliki, failed to find an alternative candidate to
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support. Still, parties of different interests with supporters from various factions came to
an acceptable arrangement on a highly contentious issue by democratic means and
without resort to violence.
It can also be argued that the elections displayed increased support for issue-based
candidates and parties over those organized along strict ethnosectarian lines. State of
Law, though mostly Shia, separated itself from the more radical and sectarian Islamic
Daawa movement by including secularists and Sunnis in its coalition. This decision was
largely motivated by the poor January 2009 electoral showing of the party, known then as
the Iraqi National Alliance, in the non-Shia areas of northern Iraq. Furthermore, State of
Law displayed ideological coherence rather than identity coherence, and “focused on the
vision of a functioning centralized government in Iraq.”282
Other coalitions organized along less sectarian lines also emerged during the lead
up to elections. The Unity of Iraq Alliance, for example:
…forms yet another second-generation alliance in Iraq’s post-2003 politics, based
on participation by politicians from various sects and ethnicities on an equal basis
and connected through certain common ideological preferences.283
Additionally, the Iraqiyya coalition led by pro-American and former prime minister
Allawi, a Sunni, “aspires to be the number one secular political movement in Iraq.”284
Parties that appealed to sectarian politics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Iraqi National
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Alliance, did not perform as well as those organized along broader, more pragmatic
issues.285
Despite the formation of a government, some aspects of the agreement have not
been realized and most of the blame has been laid on Maliki and his unwillingness to
cede power to other state institutions. For example, the agreement stipulated the creation
of the National Council for Higher Policies to be headed by Allawi. No such body has
been created, frustrating members of Iraqiyya and other parties that were to be
included.286 Maliki has also faced criticisms over his increased control of the security
forces and judicial system. While the government was formed without resort to violence
or extraconstitutional measures, the inclusion of parties with such varying interests and
motives has also made significant progress difficult.
There is evidence that even with these failures in governance the democratic
system now experiences a measure of legitimacy and stability. According to the Iraq
Country Report published by Berteslmann Stiftung in 2010, among Iraqis “there is a
widespread belief that the current political and constitutional order, at least in its broadest
contours, is here to stay.”287 Seven nationally representative surveys conducted from
2004 to 2011 by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Services,
an Iraqi organization, seem to confirm this sentiment. Their findings “reveal a significant
increase in the proportion of Iraqis who adhere to Iraqi nationalism and favor secular
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politics over an Islamic government.”288 For example, Iraqis who identify themselves as
“Iraqis above all” rather than Muslims, Arabs, or Kurds, increased to 63 percent in 2008
from 23 percent in 2004. Though this level dropped slightly to 57 percent in 2011, the
trend is hopeful.289
This information underlines the argument that engaging in the processes of
democracy helps to legitimize it and make it more stable. As Dankwart A. Rustow writes:
There must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules, but they must not be so
much believed in as applied, first perhaps from necessity and gradually from
habit. The very operation of these rules will enlarge the area of consensus step-bystep as democracy moves down its crowded agenda.290
It is true that despite their general dislike of Saddam, many Iraqis have questioned
democracy in both its imposition and its contribution to conflict. Even so, the processes
of democracy, whether elections, the passage of legislation, or application of the rule of
law, may gradually be expected as the methods to make decisions and resolve disputes.
Democracy will become more stable because individuals realize their futures are best
guaranteed through involvement in its established, peaceful institutions.
Participation in democracy might also assist in the formation of a civic, national
identity that supersedes the more divisive and potentially conflictual identities of
ethnicity or sect. Lucian W. Pye notes this possibility, writing:
In stable systems the basic political socialization process that gives people a sense
of identity also provides a recognition of the legitimate scope of all forms of
acceptable authority in the system. Conversely, a people may, through coming to
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accept the legitimacy of popular structures and authorities, develop a sense of
their national identity.291
Working through established political channels on issues of national concern will bond
individuals across communities and ethnic and sectarian groups in a way not possible in
an authoritarian system. As citizens become more involved in the political process, it is
possible they will increasingly see themselves as Iraqis whose futures are tied to those of
their fellow citizens.
Iraq’s most worrying political dispute at the present is what many see as an
attempt by Maliki to consolidate his power by eliminating political threats. This was
evident in December 2011 when Maliki, a Shia, alleged Sunni vice president Tariq alHashemi was involved in terrorism and issued a warrant for his arrest. Maliki’s actions in
this case and others have been met with criticism from across the political spectrum,
including Kurdish parties and fellow Shia Sadr and his followers.292 While many in
Iraqiyya’s bloc called for a boycott in response to Hashemi’s arrest, several members
defected and most have now returned to the parliament.293 Maliki’s critics are right to be
angered at what appears to be the prime minister’s disregard for the democratic system,
yet they have chosen to continue participating and to voice their disapproval largely
through political channels.
The practice and eventual habituation of democracy also helps lessen the
uncertainty that led to conflict during the transition. Zachary Elkins and John Sides note,
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“As democracies persist over time, individual political and civil liberties, as well as
electoral actors and procedures, become institutionalized.”294 It is through this learning
process that citizens come to appreciate a political system that both protects their rights
and allows them the prospect of gaining power in the future. They continue: “Democracy
will engender more certainty regarding participatory channels, if not outcomes.”295
Though democracy always implies at least a measure of uncertainty in terms of electoral
results and the decisions of representatives, the rules of the game or the standards under
which actors operate should be unambiguous. This will increase their acceptability
among citizens.
The 2010 elections witnessed a participation rate of nearly 62 percent of the
population, including many Sunnis. After boycotting contests in the past, Sunnis came to
the realization that their involvement was necessary to gain political power and a voice in
important upcoming decisions, including the production and distribution of oil.
According to a March 2010 report by the U.S. Department of Defense, the involvement
of political parties across sectarian lines was a “positive indicator of the legitimacy and
inclusion of the elections.”296 This reaction was reinforced by a report that nearly two
thirds of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds viewed the elections as free and fair and expressed a
belief that the parliament offered hope for the progress of all Iraqis.297
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The participation of Sunnis more generally bodes well for the stability of
democracy in Iraq, as they were the group that naturally felt most threatened by the
implementation of representative processes. This speaks to their acceptance of the rules
of the game, as explained by J. Samuel Valenzuela: “…procedural consensus are more
readily reached if the participants in the democratic process do not expect to lose all the
time, and think that no dire consequences will follow when they do lose.”298 Sunnis will
continue to vote and field candidates on the condition that they consider the political
system fair and inclusive. If, however, the political system and its outcomes become
unacceptably favorable to the Shia majority or Kurdish federalists, they may perceive
their interests as no longer served by democracy.
Most recently there has been controversy over the arrest of Faraj al-Haidari, head
of the Independent High Electoral Commission, on corruption charges. Haidari had
clashed with Maliki after the 2010 election and notably refused to hear Maliki’s petition
that the commission throw out thousands of Iraqiyya votes. In response to the arrest,
“Iraqi leaders from across the political spectrum accused…Maliki…of seeking to
undermine the country’s electoral system.”299 Sadr issued a written statement where he
declared that Maliki’s order for the arrest “…should be done under the law, not under
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dictatorship.”300 Ramzi Mardini, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War in the
United States, remarked that “the arrests are galvanizing Maliki’s opponents because of
the commission’s central importance to the democratic process.”301 Whether out of a
realization that Maliki’s increased control will reduce the electoral prospects of their own
parties, or a concern for the integrity of democracy more generally, Iraqi politicians from
all segments have voiced their dissent at events they perceive as damaging to the political
system.
Democracy can also reduce the conflict that many see as inevitable in democratic
transitions in divided states. At the conclusion of Stephen M. Saideman and his partners’
study, they remark: “Although competition can exacerbate ethnic conflict, our assessment
is that increased access will ameliorate it.”302 They confine their argument to the short
term, because they believe that over time frustrations with democracy will lead to more
conflict. Other theorists disagree, and contend the longer democracy subsists, the more
fully it will be accepted by the population as the legitimate framework within which to
operate. Guillermo O’Donnell, for example, writes, “The existence of a majority (or at
least a strong and conscious minority) of democrats…is a consequence of the existence –
over a sufficiently long period of widespread practice – of political democracy.”303 In
Iraq, it is possible that democracy will succeed if only because Iraq’s major groups have
come to accept it as the established political system.
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Conflict within democracy is resolved through legislative and judicial procedures
rather than violence. As Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk write:
…democratization provides a set of rules under which conflict can continue to be
waged through formal, rule-oriented institutions such as electoral and
parliamentary processes that offer a fundamental floor of human rights in the
event one party or another finds itself on the losing side of collective decisionmaking processes.304
Pye continues: “…well-established and firmly institutionalized structures and processes
of government can greatly reduce and even completely overcome the strains that might
arise from situations of potential crisis in the other areas of nation building.”305 Conflict
is likely both in states divided along identity lines and in states attempting to deal with
deep economic and security challenges. However, rule-based resolution of conflict in
which individual civic and political rights are protected is much preferable to violence.
When violence does take place in a democracy, it matters more how the
government handles it than that it actually occurred. This is particularly true when the
violence is on behalf of groups or factions that oppose democracy and seek to discredit it
as a system. Stepan draws parallels between the way a democracy deals with violence
and its dealings with economic problems:
…guerilla violence, like economic recession, creates problems for a new
democratic regime. However, we believe that as with economic recession, the
most important variable is the way the political system processes the facts of
guerilla and political violence.306
Democracies have the capacity to manage violence according to consensually established
rules, ensuring that perpetrators are dealt with fairly and lawfully. This further engenders
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the political system to the public, as it is just and effective in its treatment of those most
critical of it.
Though still a persistent problem, violence has lessened in Iraq since its peak in
2006. In 2011, 1,000 fewer people were killed than in 2009 or 2010.307 March 2012
marked the fewest monthly killings since the U.S. invasion in 2003. The most significant
attack during this period occurred on March 20, when a series of coordinated explosions
rocked Iraqi cities in an attempt to disrupt the upcoming Arab League meeting in
Baghdad.308 The withdrawal of American troops in December 2011 has been met with
new violence as criminal elements seek to capitalize on the gaps in security. It is too early
to say whether this uptick in attacks will have a detrimental effect on the political
process. It will likely depend, however, on how the government’s security forces and
judicial processes handle the perpetrators of such violence and if the use of violence as an
expression of grievance is increasingly unacceptable to Iraqi citizens.
The debate over the U.S. withdrawal itself confirmed Iraq’s democratic system.
Though the U.S. military’s departure was in line with the 2008 Status of Forces
Agreement signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, there was speculation
that the Iraqis would request some troops stay to provide security and training. The U.S.
was not able to secure legal immunity for any remaining troops, a condition that was
nonnegotiable for American military leaders. More importantly, the Iraqi parliament
would have had to approve any new agreement, an unlikely prospect given the
307
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unpopularity of the continued U.S. presence among many citizens. By requiring that the
elected legislature approve this type of decision, Iraqi leaders and their American
counterparts acknowledged democracy as the framework within which to address the
issue. They also recognized that Iraqi politicians would likely defer to their constituents’
opinions and vote down any agreement that kept U.S. troops in the country.
The Arab League summit in March 2012 marked a significant achievement for the
state of Iraq in terms of security and regional recognition. The summit had not been held
in Iraq since 1990, and was rescheduled in 2011 due to instability. According to Foreign
Minister Moshyar Zebari, the summit was “…a recognition of the new Iraq that emerged
since 2003 by its new leaders, its new constitution, its new politics, [and] its new political
system at the heart of the Middle East.” 309 The event did suffer a number of controversies
owing largely to the $500 million price tag associated with planning measures and the
somewhat poor attendance by regional Sunni leaders; still, its relative success does reflect
on the progress that Iraq has made in security and governance.
Finally, various Iraq leaders including President Jalal Talabani, Sadr, Kurdistan
President Massoud Barzani, and Allawi, met in Arbil on April 28, 2012, to discuss the
future of Iraqi democracy. As reported by Associated Free Press, the politicians called
“to put in place mechanisms that can solve the instability, and for ways to enhance the
democratic process and activate the democratic mechanisms in managing the country’s
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affairs and preventing dangers that are targeting democracy.”310 Sadr, in particular,
stressed the need for adherence to the constitution and the Arbil Agreement, noting,
“minorities are an important point of Iraq, and we have to bring them to participate in
building Iraq, politically, economically, and in security.”311 The leaders also stressed that
Iraqis’ economic needs must take precedence over sectarian and ethnic divisions.
Iraq’s current difficulties involve those related to the day-to-day political
wrangling of elites as they attempt to maintain their grasp on power. This is a fact of life
in many democracies, including those much more established than Iraq. Iraq’s situation is
then made more difficult by the reality that these political contests are taking place in a
new and imperfect political system, one where political instability has in the past been
associated with violence and security failures. After nearly ten years and five elections,
however, there is evidence of increased cooperation across sectarian lines. The decision
of Iraq’s political elites to act pragmatically rather than in strict adherence to identity
divisions is likely a reflection of their calculations on how best to gain power in a system
characterized by popular support.
Still, Iraq’s current and future challenges cannot be underestimated. Though
violence is a persistent threat to social and political stability, perhaps most troubling
currently are Maliki’s actions as he seeks to consolidate power, seemingly at the expense
of Iraq’s new democratic institutions. There is the potential that his political opponents
and those they represent will view democracy under Maliki as no longer amenable to
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their interests and prospects for power. However, if Maliki is forced by his own party or
others inside the government to stay within the law, and if his opponents adhere to the
democratic system in their challenges to him, democracy and its role as mediator of
competing interests within Iraqi society will be strengthened. The processes of
democracy may not be wholeheartedly embraced by Iraqis, but they increasingly
characterize the framework within which actors from all sects and ethnicities have agreed
to work.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
Democracy in Iraq faces a number of difficulties related largely to the manner in
which it was introduced and its experience with authoritarianism and an exclusive
political system that made ethnic and sectarian identities conflictual and competitive.
This analysis of Iraq’s democratic transition has sought to argue that its experience so far
is neither surprising nor hopeless. Furthermore, a review of some of the major theorists of
democratization shows that political processes may over time strengthen the system’s
legitimacy as individuals from all communities participate in and come to have
confidence in the democratic system as provider of equal representation and procedural
fairness.
States divided along ethnic or religious lines often experience conflict during the
democratization process, and Iraq is in many ways such a case. Conflict does not occur
because identities are primordial and identity groups are inevitably in opposition; rather,
democracy triggers conflict as it allows for competition among new political actors in a
context of uncertain power and security. Elites play an important role during the
transition, and their decision to focus on issues of ethnic or religious identity as opposed
to pragmatic, national concerns can increase the likelihood of conflict. It is frequently the
case that elections both highlight and antagonize identity groups and serve to destabilize
the new political system. Democratic consolidation and the formation of an inclusive,
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civic identity is threatened if political and ethnosectarion loyalties become inseparable
and cooperation among groups is seen as unlikely and undesirable.
Though democratization often intensifies divisions along identity lines, continued
participation in democratic processes has the potential to make identities less narrow and
more focused on national issues. The argument that Iraq is an artificial state as evidenced
by sectarian conflict is not fully explanatory of either its history or its democratic
experience. Accordingly, as Alfred C. Stepan and Juan J. Linz argue, “Political identities
are less primordial and fixed than contingent and changing. They are amenable to being
constructed or eroded by political institutions and political choices.”312 It is true that
under Saddam Iraq was constructed largely as a religiously, tribally, and ethnically
divided state. This does not preempt the state from developing into an inclusive and
democratic political entity even given its initial obstacles.
Iraq’s history shows instances of both discord and cooperation among the Shia,
Sunni, and Kurds. For the most part, successive leaders and an unrepresentative political
system led many Iraqis to view themselves in sectarian terms as they competed for power
and economic goods. Eric Davis notes, for example:
The 1920 Revolution set a precedent for subordinating ethnic and confessional
loyalties to a larger national entity. However, neither Great Britain nor the
fledgling Iraqi state in formed in the wake of the revolt encouraged this spirit of
cooperation.313
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This lends support to the argument that relations among Iraq’s identity groups are largely
contextual, and might have been improved if state leaders had encouraged identification
with the state and improved the political and economic interests of all people.
Relations among Iraq’s communities worsened under Saddam, particularly
following the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars and sanctions. The state was increasingly
weakened, economically and socially, and thus unable and perhaps unwilling to provide
for all Iraqis irrespective of identity. In particular, relations worsened between the central
state and Shia, Kurds, and those Sunni not favored by Saddam. According to Martin
Bunton, “Whereas the material prosperity and relative stability of the 1970s attracted
Shia [and Kurdish] support, especially in the cities, the material rewards became scarcer
in the 1980s and 1990s.”314 It was increasingly difficult for the state to substitute material
rewards with meaningful political reforms, further excluding those groups outside of
Saddam’s narrow tribal bases.
The United States made a number of mistakes in its invasion and introduction of
democracy that worsened state capacity and ethnosectarian divisions. Perhaps the most
severe of these involved the inability of the U.S. to provide sufficient security after
Saddam’s fall and during the uncertainty brought on by the transition. Adeed Dawisha
writes of the period following the invasion:
In such uncertain circumstances, the exhibition of uncontested state capacity was
thus unquestionably crucial. That, however, did not come to pass; indeed, it would
not be an exaggeration to say that the most defining characteristic of the state that
emerged after 2003 was a chronic weakness that was palpable to all.315
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New political competitors and those who opposed democracy in general sought to take
advantage of this weakness, either to gain power or to discredit the United States and its
allies. Increased instability led many Iraqis to look to their religious or tribal communities
for support and security.
Conflict largely on such ethnosectarian lines has led many observers to argue that
democracy cannot be achieved in Iraq. In this view, identity divisions are too deep and
the state too fragile for democracy to successfully engage Iraq’s communities on civic,
largely non-violent terms. Still, there is some evidence that Iraqi democracy is
experiencing a level of success even now. Despite its imperfections, the major political
actors have displayed an adherence to the procedural rules of the game. These rules are
far from ideal, yet they provide a certain level of needed certainty in terms of political
participation and electoral competition. Gradually, increased involvement according to
democratic processes may improve and build support for the system. Additionally,
cooperation across identities will lead Iraqis to engage with each other as fellow citizens
regardless of religious sect or ethnicity.
As with many divided states undergoing democratization, Iraq’s first elections
were decided largely along sectarian lines. This was less the case in 2010, as political
parties based on more pragmatic considerations made an appearance and performed well
in the parliamentary contests. The motivation for doing so was likely political actors’
desire to compete for more votes and to show progress on issues requiring cooperation.
As Stepan and Linz note, “…elections can create agendas, can create actors, can
reconstruct identities, help legitimate and delegitimate claims to obedience, and create
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power.”316 Continued experience with electoral competition and the rewards it provides
for gaining cross-sectarian support can further break down the link originally formed
between political and ethnosectarian identities.
It is especially important that in the coming years key issues related to Iraq’s
economic and political development are resolved within the democratic system, to further
legitimize it as the means by which decisions that affect all citizens are made. Dankwart
A. Rustow explains:
…both politicians and citizens learn from the successful resolution of some issues
to place their faith in the new rules and to apply them to new issues. Their trust
will grow more quickly if, in the early decades of the new regime, a wide variety
of political tendencies can participate in the conduct of affairs, either by joining
various coalitions or by taking turns as government and opposition.317
It can be argued that the political participation and success of each of Iraq’s communities
has already helped to strengthen legitimacy among such communities’ leaders and
members. Though some sense of efficacy is important, it is more the process of engaging
in representative institutions than the actual accomplishments that will validate
democratic procedures.
In terms of domestic stability, violence posed by either outsiders taking advantage
of the state’s weaknesses or Iraqis seeking to display dissatisfaction with the regime
remains a problem. Even so, democracy is not necessarily defeated by such events. As
Stepan explains:
Certainly there will always be small minorities who, knowing that they cannot
rally a large number of voters to their support, will turn to violence via terrorism
[…]. The important point, however, is that these attempts are not likely to be
316
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successful in a democracy unless there is a much broader base of support for those
engaging in the use of violence.318
If violence as a political tool and a symbol of discontent is no longer seen as legitimate,
those who employ it in Iraq will be weakened in their positions. Conversely, those who
campaign and gain power within lawful democratic channels will help strengthen the
system.
As with all democracies, Iraqis will naturally become frustrated when elected
officials do not measure up to their expectations or achieve what was promised. Still, a
“critical advantage of democracy is that it is possible to distinguish the democratic
regime itself from the government of the day.”319 Citizens can remain hopeful for the
future and exercise accountability over politicians through continued participation in
elections. For Iraqi politicians, this requires compromise and a moderation of their
positions to achieve goals and remain in office. Sunnis must realize they will no longer
hold the absolute power they did under Saddam. Based on recent events, Maliki and the
Shia more generally must come to display a willingness to work within democratic rules
and to uphold the system though this might mean a loss to their majoritarian status.
Finally, Kurds must acknowledge their place in the Iraqi state by balancing their demands
for self-rule with meaningful participation in the central government.
Democracy in Iraq then confirms the predictions of many theorists of
democratization in divided states. Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions have challenge its
transition to democracy, yet democracy remains the best system for managing conflict
along such divisions through institutions that provide equal representation and the
318
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protection of civil and political rights. This analysis has attempted to show that in spite of
its challenges, Iraqi democracy has gained a measure of legitimacy among the state’s
communities and conflict once resolved violently is increasingly played out through
political channels and along non-ethnic or sectarian lines. Increased stability and progress
on pressing economic and social problems will undoubtedly make democracy in Iraq
more secure; however, continued participation in its processes is most important in
reducing divisions and creating support for a system that represents all Iraqis equally.
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